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INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

Factors Arguing for, Against Central European Coalition

90EP0441A Warsaw *TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC* in Polish No 10, Mar 90 pp 1, 7

[Article by Wojciech Gielzynski: "Reserve Variant: Central Europe"]

[Text] Will we remain alone between a united Germany and the fired-up Soviet Union or other new states that will react to years of suffering and degradation with nationalism?

Three years ago, we already were at the threshold of a Central Europe. It almost existed, to be sure, as an ideal vision entertained in the minds of Adam Michnik, a Pole; Milan Kundera, a Czech; and Gyorgy Konrad, a Hungarian. Discreetly, a group of people would gather in the rear of the Holy Trinity Church in Warsaw, meditating the chances and shape of this future coalition whose creation was hindered only by the Soviet tyrant (so it seemed at the time). It was already cracking but no one thought that it would start falling apart so soon.

The seminar "Poland in Europe" (because that is how the group called itself) carried on beautiful, brilliant debates referring to our Christian heritage and the similarity of the fate of the nations of Central Europe to the traditions of the "Polish Commonwealth" of the Jagiellonians, to the nostalgic sentiments toward the Hapsburgs ("the older gentleman with sideburns"—recalled with nostalgia in Krakow), to Masaryk who saw Central Europe as a vast area stretching from Scandinavia to Greece as well as to Sikorski's negotiations with Benes on the subject of a Polish-Czech federation.

The Austrian philosopher, Peter Kampits, while a guest at the Warsaw KIK [Catholic Intellectuals Club] added a provocative reflection on the Central European philosophical tradition as opposed to the German one. He voiced a prophetic opinion that Central Europe "is a hope but one that will not be fulfilled quickly. However, it has a chance for a future." And he added a general directive which at the time seemed like wishful thinking but has already come true: "No realism, no reality is everlasting in history and even that which is realistic often has no future."

Fact: real socialism no longer exists in Europe with the exception of the Albanian relic (which might as well remain as a warning for future generations). The only thing is that the disintegration of the post-Yalta system has not brought closer the vision of a Europe united in fellowship and perhaps has even moved it further away. In first visiting both German states, Havel indicated which direction will have priority in Czech politics. This is how his gesture was generally received. But perhaps a bit too hastily? Mr. Jerzy Boniecki sent a letter to our editorial office (all the way from Australia!) in which he presents a different, perhaps valid point of view:

"...resenting him for first going to Germany on a one-day visit smacks of narrow-mindedness. And perhaps even a lack of understanding of the international situation. At the time that Havel was elected president, the events in Germany were undoubtedly taking the lead on the international scene and his visit may be judged as an expression of good judgment and political foresight."

On the other hand, Minister Skubiszewski expressed skepticism.

He poured a bucket of cold water on the heads of fans: "The confederation is a nice thought but politics is not made up of niceties alone. I am an advocate of a Polish-Czech Confederation. However, in order to form a union, agreement between both sides is necessary."

To the Czechs and Slovaks, a united Germany appears more like a longed-for economic partner (which cannot be replaced by rickety old Poland) than a political threat. Havel has made light of the threat of even a 100 million-strong Germany—if it will be democratic. However, we are more vigilant. But if he were to offer us a joint (to also include the Hungarians) meeting in Bratislava as a consolation... Undoubtedly, he, too, is thinking about a confederate "reserve variant," although, he places the present realities higher than the vision of the future—as is befitting a politician.

Our "cousins" appear to be even less interested in them. The Hungarians are concentrating their attention on the Danube basin and do not need Poland very much. Fascination has died out over Solidarity and a united Central Europe from Estonia to Slovenia which several years ago was the idea behind the Hungarian intellectual-student opposition. It died out because the special relations with Austria as well as the possibility of entering the "real Europe" are a considerably more attractive prospect for the Hungarians. After all, they are the first in line to the European Council and to the European Association of Free Trade which is being treated as a forerunner of the EEC. However, for the Hungarians, the "special relations" with several million of their nationals in Transylvania, Slovenia and Voivodina are a national imperative above everything else. And this must, undoubtedly, arouse the suspicion of Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia if even Budapest is holding back from territorial claims and only sighs unofficially that the Trianon treaty has reduced the country's territory by two-thirds.

They Are Afraid of Us

The thought of a Central Europe was extremely attractive until the further vision of the integration of all of Europe became the impossible dream. Now, it is becoming somewhat outdated because a "Europe without boundaries" or a "common European house" is an attainable goal which may be interfered with by regional groups, especially those that are agitated by nationalistic feelings. Meanwhile, even before the plan came about of uniting central European nations, in this or another form, and even before they became fully

independent, nationalistic specters revived everywhere. Even in Czechoslovakia, the Moravians woke up and demanded (but still timidly) equal rights with the Czechs and Slovaks. The further south into the Balkan boiling pot, the hotter it gets. Rumania has no idea what to do about the Hungarians and Germans (it is preoccupied, in any case, with the problems of the unfinished revolution); the Bulgarians have allowed themselves to be egged on by the communists against the "ethnic Turks" while the Macedonian conflict will revive any moment; Yugoslavia is in a state of upheaval from nationalistic antagonism.

Moreover (and perhaps, above all), our potential federated partners are afraid of—us. Why should they restrict (so they think) their sovereignty by entering into a limited union with Poland when they consider it to be the most powerful country of the region which has not renounced the hegemonic idea of "Miedzymorze" [isthmus]. And in addition, Poland appears to them as a highly risky partner because it is the most at risk of future conflicts with the Western economic superpower and the Eastern military one, which is particularly dangerous, because it is weakening and is, therefore, going through frustration which can cause (psychologists know this) aggressive tendencies.

The news from the North and East is also not encouraging. The Baltic states, which will probably regain their independence soon, will gravitate toward Scandinavia (at the very best); this is a reciprocated friendliness. But they can also link up with attractive Germany. The liberation of the Ukraine and particularly Byelorussia is only a hypothesis for the distant future. However, if the course of history were to pick up speed there, too, then there are no guarantees that we would gain new friends and partners because the burden of mutual resentment and the memory of wrongs suffered is too grim on both sides. Everything should be done to bury the chasm of hostility; we must believe that this can be accomplished. However, politics cannot be built on the drifting sands of belief.

Thus, are we to remain alone? In any case, we are in danger of it happening. Alone between Germany and the fired-up Soviet Union or new nations which will react to ages of suffering and degradation with nationalism.

And then...then the same trend will explode in Poland. It will easily find both the emotional fuel and "common sense" (i.e., egotistic) justifications as well as ideologists who will revive old slogans and dust off old volumes of "Pan Roman" [Mr. Roman]. This is happening already. Before becoming "sociodemocrats," communists licensed small groups of extreme nationalists whereas we got a taste of chauvinistic hysteria during the TV program "open studio" and during by-elections in the Opole region. One hears the ever more frequent opinion that since others think only of themselves, then let us also, tighten national ranks and establish a strong government; let us be united, ready and egotistic while abandoning daydreams of any supranational unions.

Such a turn of Polish social moods would denote suicide. We would then definitely exclude ourselves from the process of European integration because the West detests chauvinism, does not tolerate it and is apprehensive of it as the main factor for a break up of European unity which was being built for decades with such difficulty. Le Pen's movement in France or that of the republicans in the FRG is only a loud side note; even among those fighting for the self-determination of the Basques, the majority turn away from extremists of the ETA. If such similar trends were to revive in our country also, we can say good-bye to Europe; we would be treated as its outcasts. In the second place, the higher the flame of Polish chauvinism, of Polish xenophobia would leap up, the sooner an identical process would occur among our neighbors, particularly the most powerful ones. And the whole world would be relieved if they decided to subdue us for the sake of peace.

Abandoning Hope

For the time being, these are warnings for the future.

At present, we are dealing with a situation—and how unexpected it is—of a complete turnaround behind the Western border. And this is the topic of the day and the source of Polish concern shared by two-thirds of Poles.

Premier Mazowiecki has made a strong stand against excluding Poland from the "2 + 4" deliberations which are to decide the future of Germany. He announced that "there can be no ambiguity" on the issue of Poland's western border and proposed the negotiation of peace treaties with both German nations which would later be confirmed by the government of a united Germany.

This stand, I would think, is shared by all Poles.

But is this enough? There exists the strong probability that our demands, even when supported by the USSR, the GDR, and Great Britain would not penetrate the opposition of the FRG which rejects them!

Such a turn of events would constitute another warning signal for us but would not yet denote a real threat. First of all, because the Germans have created war several times before does not necessarily mean that it will be the same in the future. Nations change. At one time, the Belgians, the Swiss, the Swedes and not so long ago, the Japanese were regarded as particularly aggressive. Secondly, the West in its own interest will see to it that the Germans remain "anchored" in the Atlantic Alliance because they would be genuinely dangerous as a neutral state, as the Weimar Republic was following World War I. Thirdly, there exists, after all, the Warsaw Pact.... Mazowiecki has stated that he is counting on an alliance with the USSR—no longer an ideological one but a national one. Walesa added: "After all, we are in its bloc."

Tadeusz Mazowiecki is consistent in his opinions. Already several years ago (when he participated in the Seminar "Poland in Europe"), he recognized the value of

an alliance with the USSR but also perceived the weakness of the idea of a Central Europe. "What sort of cultural bond can there be between, for example, the GDR and Rumania," he declared, "or between us and Bulgaria?" He then delivered an argument which seems to be the directive of current foreign policy of the Polish Republic [RP]: "...I would try to totally eliminate the anti-Russian thorn from all of our efforts. Of course, in the sense of opposing imperial sovereignty—yes. However, if a major factor in changing Polish-German relations was the letter of Polish bishops to German bishops, then (...) something of this nature should be desired in relations with Russia. (...)"

Keeping Our Nerves in Check

The sudden change in our international situation has created an atmosphere of loss in Poland; everything has become so complicated whereas we were not prepared for it; a "smooth return to Europe" was more likely. The position of the USSR has also become complicated. As long as Gorbachev is in power and does not shift control, the Warsaw Pact appears to guarantee our safety. However, if some Great-Russian nationalist replaces him? Will then the "spirit of Rapallo" not return; the temptation to come to an understanding with the Germans, we all know at whose expense? And if the reverse will be true, then the Soviet structure will begin to fall apart. Will the Warsaw Pact continue to be a shield for us against the possible return of German expansionism?

What should we do, then?

Thus, instead of swaying from one side to the other; from "Russians go home" to "Oh, no! The Germans are coming!"—we should stick to a few axioms.

First: Since no one and nothing will prevent the unification of Germany, all activity to counter that would be like fighting windmills.

Second: Admittedly, the fate of the USSR cannot be predicted but with every possible turn of events over there, we have to concern ourselves, nevertheless, with the keeping of good and equitable relations with our eastern neighbor (or neighbors).

Third: An optimal solution for Poland would be integration with the European community whose ultimate shape, however, is not known and will form gradually.

Fourth: Besides Europe, there is the rest of the world while we are disregarding ties with it which is disastrous particularly for our economy because the "Pacific zone" is the most dynamic region of the world whereas in wealthy Arab states, money "is begging" to be made (or to be taken on credit). Why pester America for it when it is heavily in debt and looks over every dollar three times before it gives it up?

Finally, fifth: The federation of Central Europe now remains in the realm of imagination. However, history is galloping ever faster and perhaps in a few years our

neighbors will change their attitude toward this concept, particularly when they realize (something which is rather inevitable) that the road to integration with Western Europe is not at all smooth and simple. So many myths have already come true more accurately, even recently, than the futuristic "scientific" predictions that there is no reason to discard Central Europe as an unimplementable dream. Let us do whatever we can to become mutually better acquainted and enter into friendly relations with our neighbors; heal old wounds and create the beginnings of future allied institutions.

At the same time, it is worth remembering that Western Europe chose not Paris, not London or Bonn as its capital but Brussels. Similarly, Warsaw does not stand a chance in Eastern Europe. Our neighbors would suspect that we want to dominate them. Perhaps Bratislava?

For the Slovaks; satisfaction; for everyone else, the guarantee that they will not become subordinate to a more powerful partner.

Brussels and Bratislava; in other words—BB. There was a time already, when everyone was in love with those initials.

ALBANIA

Swedish Reporter Views Attitudes Toward Regime

90BA0089A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
26 Apr 90 p 11

[Article by Nils Horner: "Albania Stands Firm While New Times Press On"]

[Text] Tirana—Even Albania, which until now has been one of the world's most isolated countries, opens its door to the rest of the world—just a crack. In a speech recently, party chief Ramiz Alia said that Albania is considering reestablishing diplomatic relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. Next month, the UN general secretary will visit the country. But the regime stands firm on the communist one-party system. Swedish free-lance journalist Nils Horner visited Albania.

The Albanian Government refuses to discuss reforms, despite the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. In "Europe's ideological museum," Stalin continues to remain a hero while Gorbachev is perceived as a traitor.

But although a revolution seems to be far away, there are many indications that Albania cannot continue to be isolated. The economy vacillates, and particularly among the young people—who constitute half of the country's population—there is an increasing impatience over the lack of freedom and the fact that Albania is lagging behind.

"We want more music. More freedom. But a revolution? No, no," says a young man with sunglasses whom we met in a park in Tirana.

He turns down the sound of his tape recorder and begins to rattle off the names of West European pop stars. He wants to know if we also like Duran Duran, the Pet Shop Boys, Samantha Fox....

Few Foreigners

Few foreigners are allowed into Albania, but through Yugoslav and Italian television (Albania is the country of the tall television antennas), the young people are bombarded with the impression of West European lifestyles. The contrast is strong. It seems that Albania is 30 years behind in most respects.

Nonetheless, a one-week trip around Albania gives few impressions of open dissatisfaction. For each person who in careful phrasing criticises the lack of freedom, there are 10 who defend—and often with enthusiasm, at that—the current system.

"Albania is not like the countries in Eastern Europe. Our socialism came from within, from our own country when we revolted against foreign occupations. Albania was nothing before that time. We are proud of our independence," says Spiro Angeli in Sarande.

Fanaticism

His attitude reflects the almost fanatic independence policy that led Albania's leader for many years, Enver Hoxha, to break off from China and the Soviet Union. In a country with a history characterized by feudalism and occupation, the communist regime has thoroughly played on the people's nationalism. From Sarande in Albania's extreme south, one can see Corfu. Every year, around 20 Albanians flee to Greece. Fleeing the country amounts to the death penalty on paper, but the norm is that an unsuccessful escape attempt is punished with eight to 14 years in prison.

According to Minister of Internal Affairs Simon Stefani, there are 3,850 prisoners in Albania, of which 84 are political prisoners. Western diplomats in Tirana believe that the figures are correct.

Informants

The Segurimi Security Police keeps an alert watch on everything and everybody—even foreign "tourists." The informant system is very effective. One morning when we opted to hitchhike out into the country in a truck instead of staying on the streets of Sarande, we were only a few kilometers into the trip when two men from the hotel picked us up and, without any discussion, brought us back to town.

Not much of the desperation and the suppressed anger that permeated Romania before the revolution there seems to exist here. Food is available (meat is rationed to 250 grams a week), as well as electricity, and the society seems better organized than other prerevolutionary countries in Eastern Europe.

Little Corruption

"Although the party leaders are driven around in Mercedes 500 SEL automobiles while all private cars are forbidden, it seems that there is relatively little corruption. The leaders live relatively simply," says a Western diplomat.

The reports earlier this year—primarily from Yugoslav sources—about violent protests against the government in the northern town of Shkoder and other individual places seem to be exaggerated. Nobody we talked to in Shkoder or in the capital had heard talk about violence. A Western diplomat says, however, that a group of students was behind a spontaneous demonstration in Tirana in February where the police quickly disbanded it.

The government takes no chances. During the night, soldiers armed with automatic carbines keep watch outside the students' dormitories at Tirana University. When we ask a geology student why the soldiers are there, the answer is: "Tell us about soccer in your country."

"Stable"

The only foreign journalist who is stationed in Tirana is Li Jiye from the Chinese ZINHUA Press Bureau. He says that the situation in Albania is "stable," but he adds:

"The people in power are nervous. They are afraid of becoming even more isolated. Albania directed hard criticism against the political changes in Poland and Hungary but the tone was much milder after the events in Romania and Czechoslovakia. They realized that they could not have all these countries as enemies."

Ramiz Alia who has ruled Albania's 3 million inhabitants since 1985, has tried to open the country to external economic contacts. It is obvious that the economic development has been very weak. The country's oil and mineral resources, which in 1988 represented 40 percent of the export revenue, is reported to be declining and not meeting the new EC standards.

Primitive

The factories are old-fashioned, trucks and buses often 30-to-40-years old and falling apart. Even the country's main roads are often so narrow that two vehicles can not pass one another. The agriculture is primitive, and the supply of consumer goods is minimal. The income per capita, approximately 6,000 kroner a year, is the lowest in Europe.

In an interview with ZINHUA, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Luan Rama said that Albania wants to establish trade relations with the EC, but the EC is more interested in cooperating with the reformed countries in the Eastern Bloc. Last year, West Germany broke off several Albanian projects because of the lack of Albania's respect for human rights.

Although it is difficult to know exactly how poorly the economy functions, it is clear that dissatisfaction with the economy can be a strong driving force for change. Albania is being hit with drought for the third year in a row, and the prospects for crops this year are quite dismal. Diplomats in Tirana do not exclude the fact that violent riots can occur in the fall if the food situation deteriorates.

"I believe that the economic situation can force a radical political change of course to take place, maybe even this year. There will not be any revolution, but an internal power change away from the Hoxha legacy," says a Western diplomat.

Ramiz Alia admits that for some initiatives it is necessary to "obtain perfection." He talks about fighting the bureaucracy and about the need for younger power in the state apparatus. But he is still "a 100 percent Hoxha man," as a Western diplomat states it.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Jurist Views Unification Mechanisms

90GE0052A East Berlin WOCHENPOST in German
Vol 31 No 13, 30 Mar 90 p 3

[Interview with Prof. Dr. Edith Oeser by Gerhard Desombre and Horst Szeponik; place and date not given: "Quick Annexation Under 23?"]

[Text] We are interviewing Prof. Dr. of Jurisprudence Edith Oeser, who has been directing the Department of International Law at Humboldt University in Berlin. She is the publisher of over 100 scientific publications. Among them, she is coauthor of a two-volume textbook on international law. Edith Oeser is vice chairman of the United Nations Committee on Elimination of Discrimination against Women-CEDAW.

[WOCHENPOST] The conservative "Alliance for Germany," which just barely fell short of gaining an absolute majority in the People's Chamber elections, wants the annexation of the GDR to the West Germany under Article 23 of the Federal Republic's Basic Law. Is that legally possible?

[Oeser] Two states exist, and the relationship between them is governed by international law. Even if both states want unification, the legal foundation of one state possessing self-recognition and sovereignty cannot simply allow itself to unify according only to the law of the other state. Both are sovereign and must negotiate the conditions under which they want to come together.

Of course, it is legally possible that one state would give up its self-recognition, that it simply says to the other: I want unification according to your laws and conditions. In this case, Article 23 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic would take effect. The consequence of such a step is that the GDR's constitution and legal order would

have no effect in the unification process. The Government of the Federal Republic and the Bundestag would have no other choice than to accept the decision of a GDR which gives up its sovereignty. True, the GDR would probably have representation in the Bundestag, but given the majority relationships, there would be no possibility of having serious influence any more.

[WOCHENPOST] The right of the East German citizens to join in the debate, and even that of citizens of the Federal Republic, would be severely limited.

[Oeser] That would not have any effect. For this reason: Only a legitimate government and the newly elected Volkskammer can speak for the GDR citizens. The West German citizens would not have any opportunity to comment on this issue, either. There is only a unification process on the level of political structures. Even if the path of Article 23 is desired, with all its risks, it must be questioned whether or not there should be a plebiscite given the far-reaching consequences in the GDR and the Federal Republic. It is not a question of whether we want unification, but rather of the conditions.

[WOCHENPOST] There is an alternative in unification under Article 146 of the Basic Law. What is the difference?

[Oeser] Article 146 states that on the day a total German constitution is chosen by the people, the Basic Law loses its validity. This article and the preamble both make it clear that the Basic Law itself was considered a provisional constitution. It must not be forgotten that the Basic Law was not worked out by a parliamentary congress under participation of the people. After the allied London Conference, in 1948 the prime ministers of the western zones' eleven provinces were directed to create a constitution. And the prime ministers, in turn, employed the parliamentary council made up of 65 representatives from the provincial parliaments of that time. This took place without participation of the general public. No one asked them: Do you want a separate state with a constitution.

For that reason, the prime ministers of the eleven provinces in the Federal Republic had then clearly stated that they did not want to ultimately create a separate state. So a constitution developed which was for an interim period until the creation of a combined German state. It was demanded that the constitution not be called a constitution, but rather just a basic law. For that reason, it states in Article 146: when unity comes, then only through the creation of a new constitution.

It should not be stated here that the Basic Law is generally undemocratic or that it has not proven itself as an instrument of a democratic state. But the question of whether a people give themselves a constitution and organize themselves as states or otherwise, must ultimately be decided by them. This is a matter of the roots of democracy.

[WOCHENPOST] Article 146 does demand a new constitution for a unified Germany. According to that, the constitution of one side or the other should not just simply be adopted for the whole.

[Oeser] That is true. Forty years of developments in two states cannot simply be ignored. It would make the most sense for each to bring in what each sees as the benefits from this 40-year history into a combined German constitution worth keeping, which could then be the model for a modern constitutional development.

[WOCHENPOST] There are statements by top politicians in the Federal Republic that the GDR constitution has no value anyway. Interior Minister Schaeuble believes that the right to work and other social rights are worthless or not applicable to a combined German constitution.

[Oeser] The fact that politicians in the Federal Republic act as if they had no chance at all to reflect on their own development and perhaps capture some improvement for themselves, well, they must deal with that themselves and with critical voters in West Germany. But they will not necessarily be received with mutual adoration by the East German, because they simply damage the self respect of many citizens. I am not saying here that our constitution is an absolute good. It can be seen in the changes made most recently just how necessary these were. But the constitution does contain a number of positive elements which are internationally recognized. Among them are the union of political and social human rights, which means the material guarantees by society for the exercise of basic rights contained in the constitution. Certainly we have seen that this was not secured enough with legal, statutory and judicial means, as it should have been in a democratic state of law. But the Basic Law of the Federal Republic does not contain the principle of union of political and social human rights. It should not be debated that the right to work in the GDR led to lax attitudes which undermined production effectiveness. Also that the social net created here had negative effects on work productivity. Still, that cannot place the positive rudiments in question. Such problems are also under discussion in the West German unions and held as worthy of consideration for a reworking of the Basic Law.

Certain anti-Fascist elements of our constitution, not contained in the Basic Law, could be considered in a common constitution. I am thinking of Article 91 which precludes limitation of war crimes and crimes against humanity according to provincial law. Not the least is the treatment of private property. It is well known the devil is in the details, and there are very many details which must be cleared up before a unification. I am against Article 23, the quick annexation, for that reason, too.

[WOCHENPOST] This Article 23 speaks about parts of Germany which could join the Federal Republic. How could this happen?

[Oeser] The GDR is a self-reliant, sovereign, and independent state. What the GDR is or is not is governed by its constitution and its legal framework. Of course, the GDR constitution does not recognize a right to secede. Given that, the practice of one District deciding for itself to leave the GDR and annex itself to another state is not possible.

There is current discussion about the reestablishment of the provinces of Saxony, Thuringia, Brandenburg, Saxon-Anhalt, and Mecklenburg-Lower Pomerania. Before that happens, a legal framework for that must be created first. I cannot imagine that it would contain such a right to secession.

[WOCHENPOST] But Article 23 was already applied in 1957 in the Saarland case.

[Oeser] That is not comparable to the situation in the GDR. After 1945, the Saar territory was a part of France. Because a majority of the people there were German, there were efforts to annex itself to West Germany. There was a plebiscite in 1955, and the majority voted in favor of it. Afterward, France, which possessed this territory, and West Germany negotiated, and worked out treaties which were signed by the foreign ministers of the two countries.

The Saar provincial legislature ultimately declared that it wanted to annex itself to the Federal Republic via Article 23. After that, a law was passed in West Germany, according to which the Saarland was politically incorporated into the Federal Republic on 1 January 1957. It took two more years before the economic union followed on 1 January 1959. This was, therefore, a transition period of four years between the plebiscite and the melding of the economic structure. A customs border still existed during this time. The Federal Republic and the Saarland had the same social and economic systems, although certainly with special differences. In the process of incorporating the Saarland, many difficulties arose, and even today, the Saar is counted among the structurally weaker West German provinces.

[WOCHENPOST] The problem of transition also concerns many East Germans. Would a rapid unification bring immediate improvements or not? Some people hope so, and others fear the opposite.

[Oeser] An extended transition time and adjustment is unavoidable, which will probably be to the detriment of the large part of the East German population. That is given. But it should not be forgotten that it can have negative effects for the West Germans, too. For that reason, I repeat that it would make sense to ask the populace of both states whether or not they want unification under Article 23 or Article 146. The peoples of both states have gone through different developments and therefore have different interests—not in the question of whether they want unity, but rather how they want to have it. A plebiscite leading into this question would make sense, in order to democratically form the unification of both states.

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90GE0062A East Berlin HORIZONT in German
Apr 90 pp 6-10

[Article by Dr. Klaus Kazimirski, Hans Juergen Moehring, Volker Panecke, and Dr. Gerhard Zazworska of the editorial board: "How To Proceed With German Foreign Policy?"]

[Text] When at a crossroads it is advisable not to choose one's way blindly or to base one's decision on uninformed advice. It is well to choose carefully because the future depends on it. On 18 March 1990 the GDR will be at a crossroads and it is important to consider carefully what steps to take next.

Nobody knows where the GDR's foreign policy is going to be made—in the long building on Marx-Engels Platz near the banks of the Spree River (dubbed Winzerstube [winegrower's pub] after the former Foreign Minister Otto Winzer [Winzer: winegrower]) or in Bonn. Politicians and political analysts have speculated that the Foreign Ministry of the GDR will be nothing more than a branch office of Bonn's Foreign Ministry on the banks of the Rhine River. It has become fairly clear that Hans-Dietrich Genscher has little intention of taking over diplomats who served under Oskar Fischer.

Why this categorical break? It is not our intention here to criticize the future personnel policy of the Foreign Ministry, but it is not fair to brand as Stalinists all those simple people who four decades ago gave up their jobs to learn the art of international diplomacy from the bottom up and who worked hard to once more give Germany a good name among its neighbors. And today? Isn't it true that many GDR diplomats are well respected abroad despite the collapse of the Honecker regime because of their personal commitment to arms reduction and international understanding and because of their diplomatic expertise?

With Namibia's entry, UN membership has reached 160 and it is not yet time to scale the membership down to 159. It is impossible to sever diplomatic relations with 138 nations. The GDR is party to 3,300 bilateral and 261 multilateral treaties worldwide as well as to an additional 284 multilateral CEMA treaties. It is reasonable for these nations to care what happens once the FRG annexes the GDR. Will existing treaties expire or will they become part of a new Germany?

This issue will play an important role in foreign policy considerations of a GDR in transition, of the FRG, and later in that of a united Germany. Whatever the new foreign policy though, it should be superior to the one that both nations have practised until now. We need a foreign policy more conducive to peace, security, and global cooperation—a foreign policy free of everything that other nations have always hated about Germany. But is this a realistic expectation?

Some people make the case in favor of the moderating forces of democracy, but couldn't it also be that an economically strong and united Germany will once again resort to bragging and bullying? Has the line "Deutschland, Deutschland ueber alles" really been relegated to the ash heap of history?

The 75 embassies in Berlin have many things to ponder besides which embassy will have to shut down when the time comes—the embassy in Berlin or the one in Bonn. All the while they are hoping, that the metropolis on the Spree will emerge as the capital of a united Germany. Of highest interest is which path German unification will take after the two plus four conference, the EC-summit at the end of April, the meeting between Bush and Gorbachev in June, and the CSCE meeting in the fall. It will be crucial how the two German states will relate to other nations, how they will convince others that neither of the two German states is interested in violating legitimate interests of other nations. What exactly is at stake?

Most important are security issues: The breakneck speed towards unification harbors the dual dangers of warped perceptions and ways of thinking that only consider to the fate of the two Germanys. Not everybody realizes that the "when and how" of unification depends decisively on how a unified Germany will fit into the European security concept. Without sounding unnecessarily dramatic, I would like to stress that, "either both things succeed or neither [does]," said President Richard von Weizsaecker (FRG).

There are good reasons for linking both developments: Firstly, Germany has left deep imprints on Europe's past, its geographical location and importance affects all of its neighbors. Secondly: Europe's antagonistic bipolar order has lost its relevance. The year 1989 put an end to the East-West "fortress mentality" and German unification is to be living proof of this development. It follows then that unification must not bear the seeds of renewed instability.

To avoid such a development, the foreign ministers of the GDR, the FRG, and of the allied countries of World War II have agreed on the two plus four formula, a useful but by no means magic formula. Much is still unclear, such as a timetable and which parties should be included. Poland demands participation, Brandt proposes nine European neighbors, the EC insists on 12, NATO circles think in terms of the Vienna negotiations on conventional arms control. The many "external issues" that need to be resolved by consensus are very complex. It will take time to decide some of the most important issues, such as: Which alliance will a united Germany belong to, what will the borders of the new Germany look like, what are the rights of the four allied powers, what is the future status of Berlin, what does all this mean for the EC, what will happen to the bilateral and multilateral treaty obligations of the two Germanys, how will the new Germany be represented diplomatically.

Of vital importance is Germany's NATO membership and its future relationship to NATO and the Warsaw

Treaty Organization because this issue affects the entire future security structure of Europe. Such decisions will clearly shape the history of Europe for the next few decades, and in this context, there is little value in plans that propose ultimate NATO membership for a united Germany with a temporary exemption for the present East-German territory.

Many solutions have come from European and overseas capitals, but interestingly enough, the Soviet Union is still undecided. Moscow knows what it does not want, but lacks convincing alternatives. In general, many proposed solutions simply lack foresight, they are nothing more than pragmatic transitional solutions; others point in the right direction but lack sorely needed practical suggestions for a transition phase.

Let's see what is not acceptable. The Soviet Union rejects the idea of a united Germany in NATO—as it presently exists—with the same vehemence as the United States rejects a united Germany in the Warsaw Pact. Both scenarios would upset the balance of power in Europe, would cement antiquated notions of bipolarity, and would blur arms control issues—and as Hans-Dietrich Genscher correctly points out, arms control is at “the heart of both a united Europe and a united Germany.” Another unacceptable notion is a neutral united Germany. Nobody is comfortable with an nonaligned greater Germany in the center of Europe. Other game plans such as applying the demilitarized status of Berlin to the present GDR territory (Momper) or the stationing of German-Polish, French-German, or German-Czechoslovak troops instead of Soviet troops on GDR territory after unification has serious drawbacks because they persist in treating Germany as “divided,” although true sovereignty and security can ill afford division.

Where to go from here? Hermann Scheer and Heidemarie Wieczorek (SPD) [Social Democratic Party] have made a useful contribution: A united Germany as a member of a reformed NATO. This would mean the following:

1. NATO relinquishes its integrated forces, its joint high command, and its nuclear strategy of “flexible response.” At the same time, NATO (as well as the Soviet Union) will move all nuclear weapons and integrated troops from German soil.

2. As part of Europe's progress towards future arms limitation and arms control, a united Germany should move towards demilitarization by accepting limited low force levels and strictly defensive weapons. In addition, Germany should set an example as the first country to put its Armed Forces under a European arms control agency with headquarters in Berlin.

3. Four Power allied troops on German soil should be scaled down drastically and removed entirely after the adoption of a European protocol for peace and security.

This sequence of steps has the advantage of satisfying both present and future demands in that it makes use of the

political character of already existing alliances, accommodates transitional cooperative structures, and provides for the acceptance of future security structures. Any plan to that effect requires an expansion of the two plus four formula by adding the sum of 29—the “other” CSCE nations. Only then emerges a formula without unknowns: a formula that spells $2 + 4 =$ a new European house!

What will this new Europe look like? Will it be dominated by a greater Germany or will a European Germany find its legitimate place in the Old World? What will be the role of CSCE? Can Helsinki, the flagship of detente, still be counted on? Germany's future foreign policy will have to deal with these questions.

The CSCE acquired unexpected prestige ever since the German problem began to dominate headlines. An extraordinary summit of all 35 CSCE nations is scheduled for the fall of this year to discuss the future of Germany. CSCE also has played a pivotal role during the past few months whenever political declarations concerning the future of Europe and Germany were issued. For example: President Mitterrand bases his vision of a European confederation on the Helsinki accords, U.S. Secretary of State Baker argues for an increased role of CSCE, Foreign Minister Genscher suggests a European partnership to guarantee stability by increasing the importance of CSCE, and in Brussels, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze narrowed down Soviet visions of a common European house by mentioning a series of CSCE related details.

In the same way as a divided Germany was a central factor of the “old” CSCE, so a united Germany can become a central factor of the “new” CSCE. The unification of the two Germanys and the concomitant shift in balance could become the driving force for tightening cooperative structures within Europe. At issue is not just a solution for creating a greater Germany but the integration of German unification in the unification of Europe.

Because the nations of Europe are quite different economically, socially, and politically, and because the degree of their economic interdependence varies, the integration of Europe will not proceed in a uniform manner. Some nations have already made more progress than others. The EC has created functional models for economic interaction, for cooperation in technology and foreign policy, for structural politics, and for the coordination of economic, financial, and legal systems; and by so doing it has greatly influenced the concept of European integration. But this does not mean that the EC has consciously assumed supremacy or has sanctioned a division into privileged and underprivileged countries.

Existing structures need to converge into a Pan-European process. EC, EFTA, and CEMA countries must develop common ideas to facilitate the emergence of a Pan-European economic and social sphere that will not only open up existing cooperative programs but will also create new economic, science/technology, and environment oriented programs. Membership by all interested European nations in the European Council and acceptance of its

conventions would boost the cooperation of European nations as equals and would help bring constitutional, humanitarian, social, and democratic norms closer together. It doesn't look as if the technical infrastructure and organization of CSCE can accommodate such a program without adding new qualities and well-defined institutions, such as a European security council or a CSCE parliament.

With its forum for dialogue and negotiations and its unique circle of participants, CSCE is already an acceptable forum for the process of European and German unification. All members of NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the EC, EFTA, the European Council, the European members of CEMA, as well as neutral and nonaligned European nations are represented in CSCE. The CSCE, unlike the EC, UN or the European Council represents a classic forum for cooperation without supranational elements or a mandatory consensus. Neutral and nonaligned states are likely to find this very attractive, because in case military alliances are activated or the EC becomes too dominant, it is they who run the most risk of being pushed into a no-man's-land in matters of economic and security policy.

Clearly, CSCE cannot answer in advance all the open-ended questions concerning Europe's future, but it can offer a workable framework for restructuring Europe and unifying Germany by defining questions, testing concepts, and searching for practical solutions.

The logical continuation of bringing German national concerns in agreement with European needs and structures is to fit Germany's future foreign and security policy into a network of global obligations.

What is at stake is not a global strategy for Germany but a more convincing participation by Germans in solving the global problems of mankind. The main issue is the future of our planet—no more, no less. The writing is already on the wall: A global ecological situation grown out of hand, no solutions to issues related to energy policy and raw materials, a more and more explosive North/South conflict, and a disastrous cycle of famine and population explosion in entire regions. Needless to say, the capacity of killing the entire population several times over does not convey a feeling of security either.

Some people point out that one ought to concentrate first on what is necessary and then on what is desirable. Nobody disagrees that it is of the highest importance to find an inoffensive, responsible, and realistic status for a future unified Germany, but one must not lose sight of the fact that these intra-German deliberations come at a time when the world around us is collapsing.

The collapse of the bipolar international system and the absence of an appropriate replacement presents a challenge of global scale. Whether this challenge means further global problems or a lucky chance for mankind depends in some measure on the German position in the two plus four negotiations and on a future unified German foreign policy. In a recently published article, Marion Countess Doenhoff, said: "We have possibilities as never before. Instead of

wasting money and resources on weapons systems that become rapidly obsolete, we can save nature, can guarantee democracy in the East and economic development for Third World countries in the South."

It is clearly high time to solve global problems, especially since we have the know-how to do so. But there is little cause for euphoria. A case in point is the recently held third conference to protect the North Sea. Despite the clear realization that an ecological crisis is impending, the eight participating nations could not reach a consensus because of self-serving national interests.

The super powers themselves seem also hard pressed to part with the accustomed friend/foe pattern of an obsolete bipolar world order. How else can one explain that the Pentagon proposed to Congress a defense budget of 300 billion dollars and that the government supported this proposal by predicting a future global rivalry between the super powers. It is also curious that Valentin Falin, Soviet foreign policy and German affairs expert and key advisor to Gorbachev, said in a SPIEGEL interview when asked about what options are available to the Soviet president, that if "Gorbachev or his successor wanted to crack down on Central Europe, it would only take a few hours." Since there are no alternatives to new political thought and action, it is irresponsible to engage in game plans of this nature.

The mere concept of a new united Germany with its sizeable international political and economic impact sets important parameters. Europe is only one important issue, the other one is what strategies a united Germany will implement to address the need for a new world order. Some politicians at home and abroad envision a resurgent danger of German nationalistic narrow-mindedness—an attitude of mind that cannot, or does not, want to take a global look. Are they too harsh on the Germans? We would do well to listen to Sebastian Haffner, a journalist in West Berlin. He wrote: "Political bad sense isn't always low and ignoble, but lately it has become incredibly costly."

Within its first few hours, the new government of the GDR will have to address all these questions. It will have to come up with answers for a foreign policy strategy that is responsive to changed demands. The GDR has to conceive a strategy that a unified Germany can be proud of.

HUNGARY

Remarks Made by U.S. Official Cited

25000678D Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
22 Feb 90 pp 1, 3

[Unattributed article: "Eagleburger Values Highly the Hungarian Leadership—Detailed Information Gathering, No Promises—The Next Hungarian Government Will Not Be Able To Do Otherwise, According to Eagleburger"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The American deputy secretary of state let it be understood that in the American

leadership's view the next Hungarian Government will be able to do none other than to continue the economic policy that was initiated by the Miklos Nemeth cabinet. Eagleburger gave credit to the actions taken by the Hungarian leadership thus far, and to the role its negotiating partners played in the reform process.

Eagleburger showed understanding with regard to issues involving Hungary's economic ties with the Soviet Union, and stressed that the Hungarian public does not fully sense the content and weight of these ties. The deputy secretary of state also inquired about the removal of Soviet troops and expressed the view that the human and economic difficulties of such troop removals will also have to be faced by the United States someday. [passage omitted]

YUGOSLAVIA

President of New Belgrade Democratic Party Interviewed

90EB0335B Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian
16 Feb 90 pp 19-21

[Interview with Dragoljub Micunovic, president of the main committee of the Democratic Party, by Visnja Vukotic; place and date not given: "Collapse of a Monopoly"]

[Text] A few days ago, one more political party, the Democratic Party, unfurled its banner in the Yugoslav political sky. At the same time, it is also the first postwar party in Serbia founded after 45 years of sacrosanct rule by the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia]. The fact that it is coming onto the political scene at a time when the ship of the LCY has been wrecked in the storm of dissension at its only extraordinary congress is only a coincidence. The initiators of the founding of this party, a group of Belgrade intellectuals, addressed a proclamation to the public back in December. The founding meeting was held on 3 February 1990, when the party's statute and program were adopted and the committee that will lead it was elected.

This event was the occasion for us to interview Dr. Dragoljub Micunovic, the president of the party's main committee.

[INTERVJU] Why did you choose precisely this name for your party? Does it mean, perhaps, a renewal of the prewar Democratic Party that was headed for a long time by Ljuba Davidovic, one of the most popular party leaders?

[Micunovic] The regimes that were founded by the communist parties have not withstood the test of time. They bear the responsibility for many evils, the abuse of power, the usurpation of the people's property, the suppression of human rights, etc. These regimes completed their shortcomings with an inability to organize efficient economies. That is why it was necessary to

make it known even in the name of the party that it would be based, above all, on democratic principles, respect for human rights, political freedoms, and the interests of the people. Another reason is that reliance on democratic traditions also occupies an important place in reforming the existing society. It seems to us that of all the parties in our political past, the Democratic Party has the most moral and intellectual credit.

[INTERVJU] One can sense even from the name that the party does not have an ethnic or local slant. Do you believe that it could actually be a Yugoslav party?

[Micunovic] I do, although it is difficult to say to what extent that is feasible with the present divisions within the Yugoslav state, the media wars, and the emergence of ethnic prejudices. In any case, we already have supporters from almost all parts of Yugoslavia and all nationalities.

[INTERVJU] In the proclamation that you addressed to the public, you say that the main obstacle to establishing political democracy and getting out of the economic and political crisis is the present system, which is based on complete domination by the LC. Is the present schism within the LCY eliminating those obstacles in many respects?

[Micunovic] The present schism in the LCY will, in any case, reduce the LC's monopolistic position, but probably not equally and simultaneously in all republics. Regardless of the rhetorical statement by the highest LC bodies about renouncing their own monopoly, there is a long way to go before other political parties can be in an equal position with the LC in the political competition. The property that the LC possesses, the party's well-established administrative apparatus, and the media in its hands put us in an unequal position.

Furthermore, the LC has a monopoly in both the armed forces, the police, and the judicial system, and with those levers of power, it can still dominate society. For an equal competition, it is essential to have equal access to the media, and to depoliticize the courts, the army, and the police, so that their members could not have party organizations within those services.

[INTERVJU] The party's program directly states that its goal is to participate in exercising power. What are the chances of achieving that?

[Micunovic] Every political party seeks to win over supporters and voters, and to enter parliament. It is only by getting into parliament that it can become a real political party, and that then implies a parliamentary struggle, whether it is within the opposition or the authorities. Accordingly, regardless of its real and current chances, our party wants to behave like a real political force. Since in the past we have not had a political life in the true sense, however, and we do not have any independent institutions for surveying public

opinion, it is difficult to predict the chances of individual parties, including ours, although we do not lack optimism.

[INTERVJU] In your opinion, what would be the first step in establishing true democracy in Yugoslavia, and how much more time will be necessary for it to be realized?

[Micunovic] The first step is the political equality of citizens, which implies deleting from the Constitution those parts which favor the LC, declaring it to be the leading force in society. The adoption of a new democratic constitution would first have to be prepared by passing a new electoral law, which would guarantee conducting an election campaign under equal conditions for everyone, and direct, secret, free elections with candidates from different parties.

In spite of the current schisms in Yugoslavia, and the great interethnic tensions that are being generated from the LC into various segments of society, the general trend toward democratic reforms in Europe and the considerable awareness of our citizens that we also have to participate in them provide grounds for optimism that the process of democratization, that is, the creation of a democratic system in our country, does not have to be so long.

[INTERVJU] How compatible under our conditions are parliamentarism (free elections) and a democratic federalism in which the equality of citizens as individuals would also be guaranteed along with the equality of the federal units?

[Micunovic] That democratic federalism implies the existence of two chambers in the assembly: one that is elected in accordance with the one man, one vote principle, and the other, a Council of Peoples, in which there would be uniform representation from all the republics and which would have veto power on all issues affecting ethnic equality. We are convinced that Yugoslavia is possible as a democratic community only on the basis of the principles that I have stated. The confederal form, which has now been almost completely expressed, clearly shows that it would be a country of continual conflicts and disagreements.

[INTERVJU] Wouldn't the new autonomous areas that you foresee in your program introduce new divisions and new confusions?

[Micunovic] We only want to emphasize in principle that each republic has the right to form autonomous areas, for specific cultural-historical and ethnic reasons, and we do not mention any one that ought to be created, because that is a matter for each republic's assembly.

[INTERVJU] In view of the new changes that are coming up, how can socialism be preserved, without having it change into some new model of capitalism?

[Micunovic] One of the most difficult questions, not just for real life and political practice, but also for political

theory, is how to create economic societies that are not dominated by politics out of the existing socialist societies. The present socialist societies, which are dominated by social or state ownership, show great economic inefficiency, because they have not succeeded in solving, above all, the problem of motivation and the problem of organization. It will be necessary for state property to lose its monopoly and to be legally protected to the same extent as private and cooperative property.

What we will advocate, of course, is respect for the market and the laws of competition, encouragement for entrepreneurship, with the state playing a constructive role by encouraging and not restricting free initiatives in any type of enterprise. In addition, we will advocate social security for all citizens through an efficient social policy, taking into account the social and economic rights guaranteed by international conventions, such as protection from hunger, the right to just compensation, guaranteed incomes, and free education and health care. The democratic system that we will advocate would ideally be closest to what the developed European countries have today.

Ideological divisions into capitalist countries and socialist countries will soon have absolutely no importance at all, because both political and economic freedoms are being sought in all democratic systems, i.e., increases in social justice and social security.

[INTERVJU] How justified are the suspicions that the multiparty system in Yugoslavia could intensify the gap between republics even further, since at present, it is claimed, only republic parties are possible?

[Micunovic] I think that such suspicions are unjustified. The one-party system is precisely what has contributed a great deal to interrepublic and interethnic tensions. By absorbing all political life, the LC, divided into national leagues, imposed homogenization, and thereby antagonisms between republics. The one-party system did not leave room for people to organize in accordance with the principles of ideals and interests, regardless of their ethnic identity, throughout Yugoslavia as a whole.

The multiparty system, with democratic, radical, and liberal parties, would bring people together on the basis of political principles, just as peasant and workers' parties would be organized on the basis of the interests of individual strata, or an ecological party would bring people together on the basis of the general concern about the environment and the survival of the human race. I therefore believe that the multiparty system can only reduce interethnic tensions, and accustom people to dialogue instead of war.

[INTERVJU] At the party's founding assembly, a great deal was said about the LC's past and its mistakes. Particularly merciless criticism was directed at Josip Broz Tito. It gave the impression that discrediting him and the LC is more important than the tasks with which

the party is entering the political battle. Doesn't it seem to you that at the beginning that was not the best of recommendations?

[Micunovic] Unfortunately, criticizing the LC's policy is not criticizing the past, but the present. The same thing applies to Josip Broz's policy, as long as the LC now in power does not disassociate itself from it. That is why dealing with Josip Broz is not any kind of morbidity, or a necrophiliac need to talk about the dead, but rather an attempt to speak out openly about the still existing sources of our present crisis that are being legitimized through the cult of Josip Broz. Consequently, talking about Broz is talking about our past, which is still continuing. Otherwise, I agree with you that one should turn to the future, and our party is doing precisely that.

[INTERVJU] You have been criticized for a lack of democracy during the assembly. For example, you did not allow other opinions to be expressed at the podium, which is not in accordance with the party's name, or the principles in its program.

[Micunovic] The criticism that I conducted the assembly in an "authoritarian" manner comes from failing to understand the situation. The 1,500 people gathered at the founding assembly were not at a rally, but a working meeting. Many uninvited "guests" logically could not take the floor, especially not polemicists who would publicize another party. People here still do not understand what a political party is. Just imagine Republicans coming to an American Democratic Party convention and grabbing the microphone for counterpropaganda.

Next, in such a crowd of people who do not know each other there is a tremendous risk of "abusing" the microphone and the time—and everything that is said from the platform is attributed to the party that is presenting itself to the public. That is why it was necessary to adhere strictly to the agenda and the stipulated time. I can imagine what I would have been blamed for if all those who wanted to speak had been able to take the floor.

At the next regular meeting, there will be opportunities for us to demonstrate a democratic procedure. The same thing is true of the voting. Then a regular assembly, composed of representatives of the party's local organizations, will elect the party's working bodies, by secret ballot with several candidates, from people they will know, and they will be able to decide who to vote for.

[INTERVJU] Finally, how will your party be financed?

[Micunovic] It will be supported by voluntary contributions from its members and by income that will be earned by various activities, such as publishing, for example.

Croatian Youth Paper Describes Unrest in Kosovo

90EB0331A Zagreb POLET in Serbo-Croatian 9 Feb 90
pp 4-5

[Article by Blerim Shala: "One Man, One Machine-Gun Burst"; first paragraph is POLET introduction]

[Text] Airplanes interrupt the reading of the eulogy at a funeral. Tanks roll across Podujevo. On one of them, the number is obscured by insulating tape: Perhaps that is the one from which the shots were fired. The television broadcasts "Violence in the Streets." The police use all sorts of weapons against demonstrators (7.62-mm automatic rifles, 9-mm machine guns, 7.65-mm pistols, dum-dum bullets...)

The demonstrations by Kosovo Albanians are in their 14th day. In more than a hundred settlements, there are 300,000 people demanding that which already exists in some parts of the Yugoslav state. The police killed in Kosovo for seven days in a row. The "ethnically pure" list contains the names of 27 victims. No one is counting the number wounded and arrested. Since midnight on 1 February, the tanks of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] have maintained "peace and order." Five thousand Serbian reserve-unit policemen were brought in to "put the situation in order." Members of the "Peony" (Kecman et al) demand that the Albanians be disarmed and the Serbs be armed. Supporters of the alternative gathered 300,000 signatures for "Democracy—Against Violence." More than 6,000 communist Albanians have left the party because of its policy in Kosovo. Officials in Kosovo and Serbia allude to "terrorism by separatists and nationalists," the fifth counterrevolution, "an uprising by chauvinists." Morina is still in power. Milosevic is attempting to colonize Kosovo. Trying times have arrived. The policy of one man, one bullet.

The beginning of the bloody events in Kosovo can certainly be pinpointed to the great hall of the "Sava Center," on 22 January, when the "extraordinary congress" of the Yugoslav communist party was still under way. The failure of Ljuba Bavcon's amendment on interrupting all political processes in the party judiciary and about changing the communist model of the political offense "wrong thinking" marked the beginning of the bloody winter in Kosovo. A party that votes in favor of political repression will certainly be capable, if necessary, of pulling the trigger "against enemies." Murders on a political level have become an everyday occurrence in the "state of emergency" in Kosovo. In the 353 days that the "extraordinary measures" have been in effect, 66 citizens of Kosovo have been murdered. And even according to the "official version," the situation is much more grave, unbearable, on the brink of civil war. Perhaps there is a little symbolism in the fact that four of those murdered in the "banquet of blood" by "blue angels" have the last name Morina. The symbolism of the life of nine-year-old Milot Kryezina is obvious: born in 1981, when it all began, and killed on 28 January 1990. He is presumably the youngest terrorist in the

history of political violence. And this is certainly the first time that this type of terrorist activity has been seen in Kosovo. People simply gather, shout DE-MO-CRA-CY, and wait for the police to "do their job"—firing into the crowd. This is apparently the newest form of "hara-kiri terrorism." Because, as we know, not one policeman, fortunately, has been killed (and according to official statistics only one has been wounded by a firearm); not one citizen of Serbian nationality, fortunately, has been attacked or wounded; not one military target, fortunately, has been blown up. The police have yet to capture a single living terrorist, and have yet to present to the public even one piece of evidence (in the form of a pistol, gun, or bomb) to prove that firearms are being used against them. As we have noted, there are 27 dead terrorists. In Kosovo, "terrorism" and "genocide" are the order of the day. Serbia is "united" as of 27 March of last year, Milosevic and Trifunovic say "we will not give up Kosovo," emigration out of the province continues, and the police and army have occupied all the more important settlements.

In order to find out what is really happening in Kosovo, it was not necessary to go to the cities and villages (besides, the police opened fire in 17 settlements during the seven-day "battle against terrorists"). All that was necessary was to visit the Pristina hospital. Thus, on 1 February, scores of citizens gathered in front of the hospital awaiting news on the wounded. "Mig" jets flew over their heads, tanks rolled through the streets, and the police blocked the entry points into all the more important cities. At the hospital, doctors were fighting for lives. Inspectors from the Secretariat for Internal Affairs were monitoring every entrance into the building. The next day, Serbian doctors complained to Radivoj Popovic (leader of the communists at Pristina University) that their Albanian colleagues were using much more sanitary material in dealing with the wounded than was necessary.

In one small room, doctors showed us the bodies of Ylfete Humolli (1972) and Fadil Talla (1965). Both had been struck in the head. The blood had dried up. Humolli was killed in the village Donje Lupce (10 kilometers from Pristina) when a column of policemen opened fire on a crowd, without any warning or notice. Talla was killed in Podujevo, by a high-ranking officer in the JNA who was in tank number 12041. On hearing the tanks, this young man left his auto mechanic shop to greet the army. All the Albanians in Podujevo applauded the arrival of the column of 12 JNA tanks. Talla was struck by a shot from a 7.65-mm pistol. He was killed instantly. Talking with the doctors, we learned that 90 percent were wounded on the upper part of their bodies, that the majority of the casualties had fatal wounds on their heads, and that thus far not one policeman had requested medical help in this hospital. Entire teams operated on the wounded without interruption. They worked day and night. The mortuary, about a hundred meters from the hospital, was also working day and night. We observed a large van in Pec carrying three bodies that had been at an autopsy. Qamil Morina (17),

Gani Daci (20), and Ali Hysevukaj (20) were killed on 31 January in Pec. The police fired into a crowd. The "men in blue" prevented members of the victims' family from leaving candles at the spot where the three died. For now, public funerals are still permitted.

Following the trail of murder, we went to Podujevo. These tracks led to all sides of the bloody roads of Kosovo.

In Donje Lupce, we spoke with the father of the dead Ylfete. She was a secondary school teacher, an Albanian. On that day, she was at the place where the police opened fire mercilessly. They threw tear gas canisters just for the sake of appearances. On the road to Podujevo, we met a column of JNA tanks. We counted them for about 10 minutes, and we got up to 40. In Podujevo, we spoke with Nazmi Talla, the father of the deceased Fadil Talla. His mother still did not know that he would not be returning from Pristina. Nazmi talked about the incident, about the fact that Fadil was an exemplary soldier, and that now it was the very same military that had killed him. "We have no one to complain to... They are shooting at all of us. They throw out tear gas, some kind of special poison that does not emit smoke... Look, here you can even see the tear gas canister... Look what it says: 'For wild pigs.' I assume we're not wild animals. Or is that what the state thinks of us? I don't know... Five or six days ago, a friend from Nis (a Serb, by the way) called me and asked me, if it became necessary, to go see his daughter in Prizren and see whether she needed anything. I have never looked at what a person's religion or nationality is... But today, when I took my son to the hospital, because I couldn't believe that he was dead, the police stopped us at the village Devet Jugovica (five or six kilometers from Pristina). They were drinking plum brandy, and said that we couldn't continue along that road. I showed them the face of my son, and they waved their hand... I had to take a roundabout route... Look, tell me who I can complain to!"

Returning to Pristina, the army stopped us. We waited for half an hour. We saw soldiers camping in the meadows. They told us that they were searching for terrorists. Since they did not find any, we were allowed to continue. I was still carrying the thought expressed by Nazmi Talla in my head: "How will we call our relatives (10 of them who are currently serving in the JNA) so that they can attend the funeral? And how will those soldiers return to the barracks?"

That evening, we learned from the television that Nelson Mandela had been freed. Drnovsek was in Pristina. That day, 11 people were arrested in Kosovo.

The next day (2 February), we were in Podujevo again. At noon, we witnessed the unsupervised procession of people going to Fadil Talla's funeral. Around 40,000 of them honored the victim of political violence by silently holding up two fingers in the victory sign. The "tabut" (coffin) was covered by the Albanian national flag. Some carried black carnations. The procession passed by the house of the deceased, paying respects to his mother.

"My son didn't do anything wrong," she repeated over and over again. The speakers who read the texts prepared for the final send-off of Fadil Talla noted that Albanians still have faith in Yugoslavia, despite all that has happened in recent days in Kosovo. Several times, the reading was interrupted by the noise of JNA airplanes flying over this place. Returning from the funeral, we saw new columns of tanks moving through Podujevo. On one side there were eight, and on the other side there were as many as 25. In this second column, the 23d one in the row was missing its registration number. Or rather, the number was concealed by white insulation tape. Perhaps that tank is the one from which the shots were fired. Through a transistor radio, we attended a rally of Serbs and Montenegrins who were gathered at the "Boro i Ramiz" auditorium in Pristina.

The gathering at Boro was permitted, the one at Ramiz was not. Demands were made for that which has always been demanded at "rallies of truth." The arming of the Serbs, the disarmament of the Albanians. There was talk of the terrorism and genocide being practiced against the Serbs, about the high treason of the Slovenians and Croats. There was applause for Slobo, Serbia, unity [slozi], and deliverance [spasu]. But 27 Albanians got their fifth "S" word—death [smrt]. None of the official sociopolitical organs remembered to express their condolences to the families of the dead. More than a half a million Kosovo residents attended the burials. The film "Violence in the Streets" was shown on television. JNA officials will denied for the third time the involvement of the military in the killing of Talla. That evening, Islam Morina (35) was killed in his car in Kamenica. Kosovo alternative figures sent a protest to the federal authorities concerning "state terrorism," "death squads." Serbian politicians continued with their story of terrorism, separatism, and high treason. Morina declared on a television broadcast that he "recognizes only the judgment of the Provincial Committee," and that no one else has any right to demand his resignation. The police used every type of weapon against the demonstrators (7.62-mm automatic rifles, 9-mm machine guns, 7.65-mm pistols, and dum-dum bullets).

The next day, Slobodan Milosevic announced his idea about the new colonization of Kosovo, declaring that there is only one resolution for Kosovo: settlement. For Ruse, Slobo declared that Kosovo has always been Serbian and will remain Serbian. The idea of the pacification of Kosovo has begun to be realized.

To honor the victims of the violence, alternative groups declared two days of mourning (5 and 6 February), a minute of silence at 2:00 pm, and at 7:00 pm the citizens of Kosovo turned out their lights for 5 minutes for the 27 dead. Amidst the darkness of political repression, lights of hope for a different future for Kosovo were lit.

The kind of future that will come will be discovered by those who are awaiting a new day in Kosovo. The day that must follow the "Kosovo Kristallnacht," which has lasted now for one year.

Deportation of Immigrants From Albania Urged

90EB0335A Belgrade *INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian*
16 Feb 90 pp 16-18

[Article by Jovan Janjic: "Kosovo: The Door of Islam"]

[Text] "Conquest" by settling the inhabitants of one state on the territory of another is an illegal act under international regulations. In any case, however, all the conditions have been fulfilled for the deportation of the Albanian immigrants who are being used by certain Islamic communities as a bridge for the entry of Islam into Europe.

Finally, demands have also begun to come from official political podiums for the deportation of the Albanian immigrants who have abused our hospitality. That demand, as one of the main preconditions for solving the Kosovo problem, has already been stressed for many years by the inhabitants of our southern province who were persecuted and emigrated under pressure. There have been almost no rallies (held as a sign of solidarity with the threatened population of Kosovo and Metohija) at which that has not been demanded. The problem, however, has always been reduced to just how many of them there are.

It is now probably already clear to everyone that the excessive settlement of Kosovo and Metohija, southern Serbia, and parts of Macedonia and Montenegro by immigrants from Albania was an intentional goal—the "peaceful" occupation of our territories in accordance with a plan outlined on the monstrous map of the so-called Greater Albania. That was confirmed at one time by Enver Hoxha, stressing that he had his "two divisions" in Kosovo.

The Turkish Recipe

Modern world history knows of such cases of occupation. That is discussed by Dr. Smilja Avramov in his book "Control of Foreign Policy." For example, Great Britain settled its people for years on Gibraltar, and recently began magnanimously to offer Spain, whose territory it is, a settlement of the dispute on the basis of "self-determination," which Spain, quite logically, rejects.

Turkey has been particularly skillful with that kind of policy. Its present port of Iskenderun, formerly the region of Hataj, belonged until 1939 to Syria, and was inhabited by a majority of Arabs and Armenians, and a minority of Turks. With time, Turkey "infiltrated" more and more of its people; this was then followed by the Turkish minority's demand for autonomy, and then by organized demonstrations and the rebellion of the Turkish population. With all of this, and military pressure on the border, on 29 June 1939 "autonomous" Hataj "proclaimed" its annexation to Turkey.

Turkey used the same tactic toward Cyprus, where Greeks constituted 82 percent of the total population. The Turkish minority, on the advice of Great Britain,

received the name of a community (just as our minorities were given the name of "nationalities" by the 1963 Constitution), so that they would get greater rights than they had. Soon, that community obtained veto power, and then on 15 July 1974 that island was invaded by Turkey, using as a pretext the recent coup d'etat in Cyprus.

That is the strategy of "peaceful occupation," which is also being used by some countries today. That policy on the part of Albania toward Yugoslavia is more than obvious.

When the International Court of Justice discussed the problem of Namibia, it pointed out that the conquest of foreign territory through the settlement of inhabitants of another state was an illegal act. Even if that had not occurred, however, all civilized (law-abiding) states conduct a careful policy of controlling the settlement of their territories, regardless of whether it involves political or economic refugees or people seeking political asylum.

Our country constantly boasted of its openness to all refugees from "sinister regimes" like Albania's. In fact, many refugees were also deported from our country. It was only the Albanian immigrants whom no one touched. For example, during the well-known events in Hungary in 1956, about 50,000 Hungarians fled to our country, but our government did not want to keep them, in order to avoid spoiling good relations with its northern neighbor. Most of them were returned to Hungary, others left for other countries, and only a small number remained in Yugoslavia. The expulsion of the Germans after the war and the return of Romanian refugees do not even need to be mentioned; we know about them.

The international regulations on settling the problem of refugees are more than clear. According to the International Convention on the Status of Refugees, which was adopted in Geneva in 1951 at the initiative of the UN General Assembly, and supplemented by a 1967 Protocol, the signatory states (including Yugoslavia) have the right to deport refugees "if there are reasons of national security or public order." Also, according to this convention, it is stated that refugees have an obligation "to obey the laws and regulations, as well as measures to maintain public order" of the country they are in. This also includes a ban on political activity by refugees, if provided for by the laws of the country in question.

The International Pact on Civil and Political Rights, which the UN General Assembly adopted in 1966, goes even further, and provides for the possibility of denying civil and political rights to minorities in the interest of security and public order.

Our country also ratified that international document!

Explanations Unnecessary

According to the Convention on the Status of Refugees, no state is obliged to keep immigrants on its territory if

they work to harm it, nor is it obliged to ensure a country where they can be settled if it deports them. It is only obligated to leave them a reasonable period of time so that they can request acceptance in another country, and not return them to the country where their lives or freedom were threatened. That does not mean that many Albanian immigrants could not return to Albania, because they are not political refugees, but simply came across the border. After all, it is impossible that they are unwanted in Albania (as Albanian Deputy Foreign Minister Sokrat Plata tried to say last year in FRANK-FURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG).

According to this convention, if the unwanted guests do not emigrate within the prescribed period, then this is reported to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, who assumes responsibility for housing them. In that way, through the High Commissioner, millions of refugees throughout the world were resettled after World War II.

In Yugoslav regulations, that issue is governed by the Law on the Movement and Residence of Foreigners. Article 60 of that law says, "The competent authorities in the republic or autonomous province will deny residence in the SFRY to a foreigner who has been granted refugee status if that is required for the protection of public order or the protection of the interests of national defense, or if his refugee status is taken away." This article also says that in the decision denying residence in the SFRY to a refugee, "the authorities do not have to cite the reasons for making such a decision." It is also stated that "an administrative appeal cannot be made" against a decision to deny residence.

Emigration From Lists

Our federal Law on Citizenship also provides for the possibility of taking away citizenship. The problem is made much simpler by the fact that most of the Albanian immigrants obtained Yugoslav citizenship from the province, which is not competent to do that!

It is more than obvious that "national security and public order" are being threatened in Kosovo and Metohija and in Yugoslavia, with the participation of Albanian immigrants. Consequently, there are laws that say, "Out!"

The only thing in dispute, however, is how many Albanian immigrants there really are in Yugoslavia. The public and the state authorities cannot agree at all. While the figure of about 300,000 immigrants is cited among the public, the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs came out not too long ago with the statistic that only 15,000 immigrants had come from Albania since 1941. That is probably only the number of those who legally requested refugee status from the appropriate federal authorities, and not those who actually ended up in the province. On the basis of some other sources, the people were even too modest in citing the figure of 300,000, because many also emigrated from the lists, if they were on them at all. That particularly applies to the period after July 1966, when Albanian immigrant Dzevdet Hamza became the Provincial Secretary of Internal

Affairs. At that time they began to destroy all the information and documentation that had been collected for years about the activity of Albanian emigres in the SFRY.

But that should not be any sort of obstacle to satisfaction of the requirements for deporting the immigrants, because, after all, there are many living former residents of Kosovo and Metohija who were driven out so that immigrants from Albania could be settled in their homes and properties.

It is estimated that during the war alone, about 75,000 Albanians came to Kosovo and Metohija from Albania. This settlement process continued even after the war. Before 1948, before the time of the customs union with Albania, while there were ideas in circulation about some sort of Balkan federation, thousands of them legally crossed the border. The influx continued after the Cominform, so that it is estimated that just from 1948 to 1956, about 40,000 new immigrants crossed the border into Yugoslavia. The next great wave was after the Brioni plenum in 1966, when many people interpreted Rankovic's defeat as a defeat for Serbia. The emigration of the Serbian population from Kosovo and Metohija became particularly obvious after that year, so that from that time until today, about 250,000 Serbian residents left the province.

A Danger to Europe

There are also more and more views concerning the role of the Islamic communities in Kosovo and Metohija. Anyone who is at all familiar with the situation in this province of ours will agree that a religious war is also being conducted in Kosovo and Metohija: it is being conducted by Islam against Orthodoxy, just as it was six centuries ago. That was also emphasized by some of the endangered residents of the province at their protest meetings during the recent unrest.

In May, the Italian newspaper IL MERIDIANO published an extensive article entitled "The Bomb Called Kosovo." In that article, which also mentions the figure of about 300,000 Albanian immigrants, the author says that with the Albanianization of Kosovo and Metohija, there is also a danger of the Islamicization of Yugoslavia and Europe. Quite logically, there is also a warning about the possibility of the Islamicization of Italy through Yugoslavia, because Kosovo has always been assessed as the most convenient door for Islam to enter Europe. Among other things, this article says:

"Finally, we believe that on the basis of the aspect presented, Italians and Europeans in general should give more thorough consideration to the issue of Kosovo, which is not just a Yugoslav problem. We also believe that there should be more a objective understanding and judgment of the present position of the Serbian people... Albanian propagandists of various tendencies, from Hoxha's Stalinists to Zogu's adherents and Khomeini's fundamentalists, are today unanimously asserting the danger of the 'Serbianization' of Kosovo. It appears,

however, that what they have in mind is the Islamicization of Yugoslavia, and perhaps the Islamicization of Europe as well."

It is in that context that one should also view last year's coverage by a newspaper in Saudi Arabia (the center of the Islamic religion), SAUDI GAZETTE, which called upon all Moslem countries to find a way "to overcome the problems being faced by Albanians in Albania and outside it." At the same time, SAUDI GAZETTE proposed that the Islamic Conference form a study group and send a delegation to Yugoslavia. The newspaper demanded that another study group, for investigating the position of Albanians in Yugoslavia, be formed by the London Institute for Issues of Moslem Minorities, and should offer "proposals for guaranteeing a better life for Yugoslav Albanians."

The peak of the Islamic campaign against Yugoslavia came a few days ago from Iran. The newspaper KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, in connection with the latest major Kosovo unrest, listed Yugoslavia as one of the countries where "Moslems were being killed." Without going into the essence of the Kosovo tragedy, it only offered its readers the conclusion that the security forces were "opposing Islam" in Kosovo and in Yugoslavia.

Croatians Polled on Interethnic Relations

90BA0018A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
6 Mar 90 pp 7-10

[Article by Dejan Jovic: "Who Is Preserving Yugoslavia?"]

[Text] The closer the first multiparty elections in Croatia approach, the more evident it is that there will be uncertainty about their result right up until the very act of voting, which is just less than one and 1/2 months away. But even now it seems certain that the main battles will be waged over several political topics on which there is an immense difference between the left-wing bloc and the political organizations in the republic which are today in the opposition. Among the political topics which will be covered more and more fiercely all the way to the end of the election campaign, the one at the very top will certainly be the attitude toward the arrangement of interethnic relations in Croatia and in Yugoslavia. Even today, that is, it is clear that the greatest difference among the competing parties is over the nationality question—as, in fact, has been the case down through the entire stormy history of our geographic and political space. It is, then, as though we are just now seeing the fulfillment of what once was a prophecy only in principle to the effect that multiparty political systems and ethnic parties (in mutual conflict and divided a priori depending on the ethnic program which they advocate) are inseparable political twins. And while the parties in Croatia today are in many respects similar or identical, there will be few citizens who will not make their final decision as to whom to give their vote precisely on the

basis of those segments of the election programs (which today are already more recognizable than earlier).

Those are already sufficient grounds for the research team of DANAS to undertake a public opinion survey concerning interethnic relations in three differing cities in Croatia—Knin, Varazdin, and Karlovac. Selecting one city in which there is a Serbian majority in the population, another which is almost entirely Croat, and a third with a mixed ethnic composition, we sought answers to these questions: Do citizens (that is, a representative sample of respondents) feel that the nationality question has been satisfactorily resolved in Yugoslavia today, do they think that life in Yugoslavia is a necessity, something to be desired, impossible, or a mistake, what relations do they have with citizens of a different nationality where they live and work, what is the greatest danger to those relations, what organization, leadership, or institution do they believe could be the best guarantee of the equality and stability of interethnic relations in Yugoslavia, and what political party do they think has the best program for resolving the crisis of interethnic relations in the country?

A Majority for Yugoslavia

The first question was to get the respondents to indicate their attitude toward the need for Yugoslavia's existence as a state. Analysis shows that a large majority of citizens in all three cities (92 percent in Knin, 92.2 percent in Karlovac, and 78.6 percent in Varazdin) feel that the existence of Yugoslavia is desirable or even necessary. But it is also without doubt an interesting datum that in Knin 7.2 percent, in Karlovac 7.8 percent, and in Varazdin 18.1 percent of the respondents feel that life together in Yugoslavia is no longer possible, since relations among our nationalities have been upset beyond repair. It is evident from the table that there are significant differences in responses among respondents from those three towns. Thus, in Knin all of 46 percent of the respondents said that the existence of Yugoslavia was a necessity without any qualification. That percentage was much lower in Karlovac (26.7 percent), and still lower in Varazdin (8.5 percent). In the two latter cities, preference is given to the "conditional" existence of Yugoslavia, and that conditionality is related above all to a federalist conception of realizing the sovereignty of each nationality within the framework of a common state.

The answer to the first question was indeed essentially defined by the ethnic commitment of the respondents. For example, in Knin, respondents of Serbian nationality favored "unconditional" existence of Yugoslavia twice as often as those of Croatian nationality, and in all three towns they supported much less frequently the thesis (which was recently uttered even by Slobodan Milosevic) that Yugoslavia's existence, although desirable, is not necessary, since every one of our nationalities can realize its own national interests even without Yugoslavia. In Karlovac, similar responses came from respondents who are ethnically committed as Yugoslavs, and

they chose the necessity and unconditionality of Yugoslavia's existence as their own attitude twice as frequently as other respondents. It is interesting to see that the percentage of respondents who said that they had never supported Yugoslavia's existence was extremely small (almost negligible), and in view of the more frequent recent tensions (especially in Knin and Karlovac) in interethnic relations, it is difficult to overlook the datum that in those cities fewer than eight percent of the respondents found that life together is today completely impossible within the same state. It is a kind of curiosity that Varazdin, as the city which is more homogeneous in its ethnic composition, was more firmly bound to this proposition than the other two cities.

Those who say to a significant extent that life together is no longer possible certainly include respondents who feel that organizations of the so-called Croatian orientation (the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], HDS [Croatian Democratic Party], HSLS [Croatian Social-Liberal Alliance], HSS [Croatian Peasant Party or Croatian Independent Party], and HKDS [Croatian Christian Democratic Party]) have the best program on the nationality question. But, although 28.2 percent of those respondents (potential voters for those organizations in the upcoming elections) think that way, only 3.5 percent of them never supported Yugoslavia's existence. Potential voters for the League of Communists (that is, the League of Socialists) feel to a greater extent than others that Yugoslavia's existence is a necessity (43.7 percent), while supporters of the ethnic program of the Serbian parties (the Democratic Party, the Yugoslav Independent Democratic Party, and the Radical Party) think that only half as often.

Ethnic Intolerance

Particularly interesting results were obtained, however, from an analysis of the replies to another question which called upon the respondents to choose one of the three answers offered to express their attitude toward the present model for resolving the nationality question in Yugoslavia. It turned out, that is, that in none of the cities did more than a third of the respondents say that the nationality question had been solved satisfactorily. Thus, in Knin 18.7 percent of the respondents, in Karlovac 28.7, and in Varazdin only 9.6 percent would say that they were satisfied with those solutions. This is certainly disastrous for the policy of a state which has had as its main slogan "Brotherhood and unity" and which until quite recently felt that it had finally resolved the nationality question to the general satisfaction. All of three-fourths of possible adherents of the organizations in power today (the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] and the SAWP [Socialist Alliance of Working People]) avoided circling that answer, and only those declaring themselves to be Yugoslavs showed a higher degree of satisfaction (37.8 percent). Contrary to present interpretations to the effect that a new solution of the nationality question in the country is being sought above all within the Serbian nationality (in Kosovo, in Croatia, in Bosnia) and to the effect that that nationality

is the least satisfied and the most upset by Yugoslavia's present arrangement, the results of this survey show that the Serbs included in the sample (including followers of the League of Communists) showed the least interest in seeking a new (and essentially different) resolution of the nationality question. In Knin, this was the response of 29.1 percent of all the respondents (slightly more Croats than Serbs, and Yugoslavs least of all); in Karlovac 34.1 percent (this time the Yugoslavs were the highest, then the Croats, and then the Serbs), while in Varazdin the number of those proposing essential changes climbs to 42.8 percent. This response was chosen far more frequently by potential voters for the organizations of the "Croat bloc" (54.1 percent), while adherents of the ethnic programs of the Serbian organizations answered most frequently that the nationality question in Yugoslavia had in principle been given a satisfactory theoretical solution, but that in practice there was ethnic inequality. It is interesting, however, that both groups are quite disinclined to give a favorable assessment to the present solution, and among those who think that one of the organizations of Serbian orientation has a good program for the nationality question there is not a single respondent satisfied with the present ethnic solutions. This accentuates the initial hypothesis that aggravation of the nationality question in Yugoslavia and raising the issue of a new resolution would be an essential element in the election program and political program of all political organizations in these elections and would essentially decide their result.

The third question called upon the respondents to express their position on the actual state of interethnic relations where they themselves live and work by choosing one of the six answers offered (arranged on a bipolar value ladder). The results only appear to be surprising to all those who are inclined to base their political analyses on prejudices and stereotypes. It might be a surprise, that is, that in Varazdin, where nine-tenths of the population belong to the same nationality, people chose more frequently than in Knin and Karlovac the responses "ethnic intolerance" (15.5 percent), "ethnic inequality and mutual threats" (11.8 percent), and "conflicts on an interethnic basis" (17.3 percent). At the same time—and this is less surprising—one-fourth as many used the traditionalist concept of brotherhood and unity, which has been almost entirely displaced by the term "ethnic equality." That surprise (similar results were to be repeated later on several other occasions) can be explained precisely by Varazdin's ethnic homogeneity, in that interethnic relations are almost an abstract idea. For precisely that reason (by contrast with Knin and Karlovac), the assessment of the true state of those relations is often shaped under the influences of news about ethnic conflicts—somewhere far away, and the responses are projected onto Yugoslavia as a whole. This is also evident in the situation where the people of Varazdin indicate more frequently than other respondents that "separatist tendencies" represent a great danger to their interethnic relations.

But it is certain that many oversimplified suppositions are broken down by the results obtained in Knin. There, 77 percent of the respondents declared that their relations could best be described by one of three "favorable" terms—"brotherhood and unity" (27 percent), "ethnic equality" (19 percent), or "good relations with occasional minor disagreements" (31.1 percent). An almost identical result was obtained in Karlovac, with somewhat more equal frequencies among those three responses. The goaders and outside prompters of the "threatened brothers" will be very dissatisfied with the findings of this survey, which indicate that in Knin only 5 percent of respondents of Serbian nationality feel that they are ethnically threatened or unequal, while about 13.2 percent of them find that relations in their environment are best described as "ethnic intolerance." But by contrast with those two categories, which the Serbs in Knin chose twice as frequently as the Croats there, respondents of Croatian nationality indicated much more frequently (14.3 percent) than the Serbs (3.6 percent) that there are conflicts on an ethnic basis. It is not precluded, however, that the results were altered essentially by the mechanism of projecting one's own assumptions onto a higher level (the position of Serbs in Croatia, say, or that of the Serbs or Croats in Yugoslavia).

As far as the results of this survey are concerned, it turns out, then, that in Varazdin, thanks above all to the projection of the general political crisis onto their own environment, the respondents feel much more unequal and mutually intolerant and have more frequent conflicts on an ethnic basis than in Knin or Karlovac, where people of different nationalities are in everyday contact. That fact, that almost 45 percent of the people of Varazdin in the sample, who are Croats, chose one of these three answers, also shows much greater prospects for the alternative in the upcoming elections in this city, which incidentally is also evident when we analyze responses to certain other questions in this survey.

The Fear of Kosovization

The fourth question called upon the respondents to choose two of the eight answers offered and thus to say which of the political phenomena they considered to be the greatest danger to interethnic relations in their environment. The results are extremely indicative of all three environments.

First of all, in all three places the answer "events in Kosovo and the policy toward Kosovo" was chosen very frequently. This answer was included in the survey in order to see how everything happening in Kosovo and concerning Kosovo (regardless of the judgment of the respondent as to who is more right and who is less right in those events) is affecting interethnic relations, and is it laying the basis for what has been referred to as "Kosovization of Yugoslavia." The answer is "certainly." In Knin, 38.4 percent, in Karlovac 44.7 percent, and in Varazdin (once again the most) 46.6 percent of the respondents include this one in their choice of two

answers. In Knin, however, another answer was nevertheless winner—"establishment of ethnic parties." All of 50 percent of all the respondents chose this phenomenon as the most dangerous threat to interethnic relations in their own environment. That is the opinion of all of 72 percent of the respondents in Knin who are ethnically committed as Yugoslavs. In Karlovac, that answer was in second place on the ranking of "dangers" (39.3 percent), and it was chosen with particular frequency by respondents of Serbian nationality (50.9 percent), while in Varazdin it was in third place (26.1 percent). Guided by the logic of projection which we have already explained and also by their own identification of separatist tendencies with the events in Kosovo (by contrast with the other environments, where the conception of this term has nevertheless been extended a bit to include its "Western" variant—as the policy of Croatia and Slovenia)—in Varazdin 27.3 percent of the respondents opted for "separatist tendencies" to describe the danger to relations among the nationalities. It is interesting, however, that in all towns Croats chose this response more frequently than others.

In Knin, "influence of the news media" was also high on the list; it was chosen by one-fourth of the respondents as a great danger to interethnic relations in their environment, commenting in this way on the manner in which that town has for some time been at the center of the "media war." In Knin and Karlovac, 17 percent and 14 percent, respectively, see the danger above all in a tax on the YPA and in the threat to its unity, while in Varazdin this was the response of 8.3 percent of the respondents. But a significant difference occurs in the frequency of the answer "unitaristic tendencies." This is a danger felt by hardly anyone in Knin (1.8 percent, and that "thanks" above all to the Croats there). In Karlovac, 8.2 percent see the greatest danger from unitarism (there are no Serbs among them, and only a few Yugoslavs), while in Varazdin all of 23.9 percent of the respondents said that this could be a strong blow to the stability of ethnic relations. Certain differences, but in the opposite direction, are also indicated in the assessment that the split in the LCY is one of the two greatest dangers. This was asserted by 10.2 percent of the people from Varazdin, 16.8 percent of those from Karlovac (more Serbs than others), and 23.6 percent of those from Knin (all nationalities equally). It seems, however, that the people of Varazdin have nevertheless adapted far better to the multiparty system (it is seen as a danger by 3.8 percent of the respondents) than those from Knin (9.9 percent), and better still than those from Karlovac (15.6 percent).

If we analyze the combinations which the respondents chose most frequently (since they were able to mark two answers), then in Knin the most frequent combination was the establishment of ethnic parties and the events in Kosovo (40 respondents) and the influence of the media (34 respondents). In Karlovac, the combination of responses chosen most frequently was "establishment of ethnic parties" and "events in Kosovo," and Kosovo and a tax on the YPA was chosen much less frequently. In

Varazdin, the dispersion was more significant, and at the top there were three combinations including Kosovo—most frequently with separatism, then unitarism, and then also with the establishment of ethnic parties.

The respondents were also given the opportunity to answer this question by writing in their own answers. Among the write-in answers we should single out three groups: The first group of responses (the most numerous) has to do with the policy of Serbia (Milosevic, the Memorandum, Serbia's policy, hegemonism and centralism, and so on), a dozen or so were related to general problems (economic, social, and ethnic), and three or four objected to certain political phenomena in Croatia (most frequently the alternative, but also the League of Communists of Croatia). The first group was most numerous in Varazdin, the second in Karlovac, and the third in Knin.

No Guarantee of Security

The fifth question called upon the respondents to choose one of the political institutions, organizations, or leaderships from a list of eight which they felt to be the most important guarantee of equality and the stability of interethnic relations in the country. The citizens were allowed the possibility of writing in their own answers as well as the opportunity to choose the answer "I do not see any guarantee for interethnic equality and security."

This last answer was chosen by 10 percent of the respondents in Knin (more Croats than others), 15 percent of the respondents in Karlovac (also slightly more Croats, but negligibly), and all of 28.4 percent of the respondents in Varazdin. In Varazdin, this put the answer that there is no guarantee of interethnic stability in first place among the answers with respect to frequency.

In any case, the differences from city to city are great. In Knin, the first place was taken without competition by "the Yugoslav People's Army" (all of 47.4 percent). The fact that it is followed by the Yugoslav Assembly with 12.8 percent of the respondents and the Federal Executive Council with 11.4 percent indicates a possibility of which quick-trigger political bookmakers would take advantage by betting 4:1 for the Army in case of a possible public dispute between these institutions. That situation is, of course, all the more indicative because in the Serbian segment of the sample in Knin the ratio climbs even higher (53.2 percent, 12.7 percent, and 6.8 percent, respectively). In Knin, slightly less than a tenth of the respondents consider the League of Communists of Yugoslavia the greatest guarantee of stability, but even with that percentage it is double the number of respondents in Karlovac and almost tenfold the number in Varazdin choosing that answer. The SFRY Presidency did extremely poorly in all the towns—in Knin it fared the worst with 4.2 percent of the respondents, and in Karlovac and Varazdin it was also at the bottom of the list with 6.6 percent. The Secretariat for Internal Affairs and SUBNOR had no chance at all in this competition, of course, and the alternative political parties did poorly

in Karlovac and Knin, but very well (all of 10 percent) in Varazdin. This gives us another datum for comparison that indicates that the respondents in Varazdin have much greater belief in the stabilizing role of the alternative than in that of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia specifically concerning the program for resolving conflicts in interethnic relations.

In any case, in both Karlovac and Varazdin the Federal Executive Council did better than all the others—in Varazdin the only ones "better" than it were those who saw no guarantee at all for the stability of interethnic relations, while in Karlovac it was followed closely by the Yugoslav People's Army. In general, we note a considerable difference between respondents of Croat and Serb nationality over the question of whether they believe more in the Army or the Federal Executive Council. A similar difference can be recorded with respect to educational structure, since those with elementary education choose the YPA twice as frequently (47.1 percent) as respondents with four-year postsecondary education (23.6 percent). But the latter say that they see no guarantee of stability far more frequently (24.5 percent) than those with elementary education (9.6 percent).

Many Abstentions

And finally, the sixth question was the only one in the entire questionnaire that was formulated without offering any answers, and the respondents were left to freely write in the name of that political party which they felt offered the best solution for interethnic relations in the country. The results obtained in the answers to that question indicate that the percentage of uncommitted, confused, or very dissatisfied citizens is still very high. When we add to the respondents who wrote in that no party has a good ethnic program those who left the question blank, we get 42.5 percent of the respondents in Knin, all of 62 percent in Varazdin, and an incredible 72.9 percent in Karlovac. This means that bolder analysts would forecast without any great difficulty that at this point the citizen would like best not to be in the position of having to choose among the present parties, since in none do they see a good program for one of the most important and sensitive political issues. At this point, this can hardly be interpreted as the unfamiliarity of the electorate with multiparty elections, just as it is no longer possible to attribute all this to a lack of public interest in political programs.

Which political party do you feel offers the best solution for interethnic relations?

Political Party	Knin	Karlovac	Varazdin	Total
LCY	131	47	12	190
Croatian LC (Social Democratic Party)	3	4	13	20
Alliance of Socialists	1	1	1	3
Croatian Democratic Community	3	5	40	48
Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative	2	4	2	8
Croatian Social-Liberal Alliance	0	1	3	4
Croatian Socialist Youth League (ADSH)	0	0	0	0
Croatian Peasant Party	0	0	2	2
Croatian Social Democratic Party	0	0	3	3
Croatian Democratic Party	1	4	15	20
HKS [(?) Croatian Christian Party]	0	0	0	0
Greens	3	2	7	12
TRS [Transnational Radical Party] (RUUE)	0	0	1	1
Democratic Party	1	0	0	1
Radical Party	0	0	0	0
Slovenian LC	0	0	3	3
Yugoslav Independent Democratic Party	21	2	1	24
No party	103	142	140	385

In Knin, 46.4 percent of the respondents answered that the LCY has the best program for resolving the so-called nationality question, although we cannot but mention that the ratio between those who supported the LCY and those who answered—the Croatian LC (Croatian LC-Social Democratic Party) was 13:3. This certainly indicates how a possible definitive parting of the ways between the federal and republic leadership of the LCY would be seen in Knin. It is quite the other way about in Varazdin (12:13). Aside from the League of Communists, in Knin there are almost

no parties that could count on any results in the elections (results that would be at least partially satisfactory). The Yugoslav Independent Democratic Party (recently established in Vojnic) has so far captured about seven percent of the respondents with its nationality program, although in this survey they wrote the very name of the party in four different ways. No one was committed to the Serbian LC, while three respondents chose the national program of the Croatian Democratic Community, and the same number the Greens, two were for the Association for a Yugoslav

Democratic Initiative, and one each for the Alliance of Socialists, the Croatian Democratic Party, and the Democratic Party (Kosta Cavoski).

In Karlovac, meanwhile, the League of Communists got by with a relative majority of only 19.8 percent. But even that was enough for an incomparably better position than all the others since the "abstainers" were in the majority (72.9 percent). The program of the Croatian Democratic Community was chosen by five respondents, there were four each for the Croatian Democratic Party and the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative, two apiece for the Greens and the Yugoslav Independent Democratic Party, and one respondent each for the Socialists and the Croatian Social-Liberal Alliance.

But the picture was different in Varazdin. Following the group of "abstainers" comes the Croatian Democratic Community with 40 respondents who regard its program as a model for resolving ethnic relations (14.8 percent), then the Croatian LC-LCY (9.23 percent), and the Croatian Democratic Party (5.54 percent).

It is very interesting here that in Knin the LCY has half as many members as those who sympathize with its ethnic program, while in Karlovac they are approximately equal, and in Varazdin there are even Communists in the sample who do not think that the program of their organization is the best. That gives greater significance to the results, which show that in the Varazdin sample, the Croatian Democratic Community has only 5 members, but 40 supporters. Although it must be emphasized that the survey was conducted before the First General Assembly of the Croatian Democratic Community, still it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this organization has fewer members than has been reported, but in some opstinas it has more adherents than one would have imagined.

When we look at the ethnic composition of the respondents, we cannot escape the fact that in the sample Croats give somewhat more support to organizations representing an alternative of "Croatian orientation" (21.6 percent) than a possible coalition between the Croatian LC and the SAWP (14.5 percent). But that result can be deceiving, since the category of "alternatives with Croatian orientation" includes many organizations which very probably will not be working together in the elections.

The Serbian segment of the population, however, is markedly committed to the LCY (in spite of the fierce criticism of its leadership that has been coming precisely from Knin and other towns with a Serb majority). In this sample, then, 42.9 percent of the Serbs think that the LCY has the best ethnic program, and 9.3 percent opt for parties with Serbian orientation. Even those declaring themselves to be Yugoslavs support the ethnic policy of the LCY in 45.2 percent of the cases. It is interesting, however, that there are no Yugoslavs in the sample who support the ethnic programs of parties of "Serbian orientation."

What, then, do the findings of this survey show?

That we are entering upon 50 days of tension in which the electorate will be pulled leftward and rightward? That there is passivization and resignation on the part of the public, who are expected to work out the "country's destiny" and accept "historic responsibility"? That the moral of the wonderful joke of Dr Dusan Bilandzic about the animals being let out of the zoo is being confirmed? A reaffirmation of the grounds on which the immense majority of respondents in a previous public opinion survey referred to the Tito era as a period of personal and social security of the individual? That we are seeing a kind of "flight from freedom"? That the vision of some new "protectionism" is perhaps being built on foundations of uncertainty and insecurity? That the multiparty system has come so unexpectedly that it has broken down too rapidly the illusions easily promised about a new model of a society of justice and happiness?

Or that all of this is just some new child's disease of the multiparty system?

[Box, p 9]

Karlovac, Knin, and Varazdin

The survey entitled "Views of Citizens Concerning Interethnic Relations," conducted by the DANAS research team (Gordan Bajtek, Dejan Jovic, Ines Lovric, Vidmir Raic, Gordana Skaljac, and Milica Sundov), was conducted with a written questionnaire in Karlovac, Varazdin, and Knin between 19 and 22 February 1990.

In Knin, the poll included 289 respondents; 76.1 percent of them were of Serb nationality, 9.7 percent Croats, 11.1 percent declared themselves to be Yugoslavs, and 3.1 percent belonged to other nationalities. In that same town, 12.8 percent of the respondents had elementary education, 42.6 percent secondary, and 32.5 percent higher education (12.1 percent of the respondents did not answer the question about education). A majority of the respondents (73.4 percent) were between the ages of 25 and 50, 23.5 percent belonged to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, 3.1 percent to the Yugoslav Independent Democratic Party, 1 percent to the Alliance of Socialists, 0.3 percent to the Croatian Socialist Youth League, and the others were not members of any political party. The average age of the respondents in Knin was 36 years. The respondents were polled in the following enterprises: the Knin Screw Factory, the Dinara Construction Work Organization, Agroprerada (agricultural processing), Dalbih, the Knin Railroad Transportation Enterprise, MLADOST, as well as in the "National Heroes" Elementary School, Radio Knin, the opstina assembly, and among farmers and the unemployed.

In Karlovac, there were 258 respondents in the survey, 57.4 percent of them Croats, 21.3 percent Serbs, 15.1 percent Yugoslavs, and others represented slightly more than six percent. Among the respondents, 19 percent had only elementary education, 50.4 percent secondary, and

17.4 percent higher education. By age, 2.7 percent of the respondents were under age 25, 64.2 percent between the ages of 25 and 50, and 12.5 percent were over 50. As to political affiliation, 21.7 percent of the respondents are members of the LCY (Croatian LC), 1.6 percent belong to the Croatian Democratic Community, 0.4 percent the Alliance of Socialists, the Croatian Democratic Party, and the Transnational Radical Party. The respondents were surveyed in the following enterprises: Zitoproizvod, Standard Konfekcija, the Karlovac Commercial Bank, the Ognjen Prica Printing Plant, the Karlovac Brewery, the opstina assembly, Radio Karlovac, and KARLOVACKI TJEDNIK, as well as among pensioners and unemployed citizens.

In Varazdin, the survey included 271 respondents, 91.1 percent of them Croats, 4.4 percent Yugoslavs, 1.1 percent Serbs, 0.37 percent Slovenes, and others represented three percent of the sample. In the sample, 6.6 percent of the respondents had elementary education, 52.4 percent secondary, and 33.9 percent had higher education. As to age, 20.3 percent of the respondents were under 25 and 12.5 percent were over age 50. As to political affiliation, 13.3 percent of the respondents belonged to the LCY (Croatian LC), 1.8 percent to the Croatian Democratic Community, one belonged to the Croatian Democratic Party, and two to the Alliance of Socialists. The average age of the people surveyed in Varazdin was 34.6 years. The sample was made up of respondents from these enterprises: Koning, Viko, Koka, Varteks, ATP, Varazdinka, Varazdin Bank, the University School for Organizational and Information Sciences, the hospital, and private artisans.

Croatian Democratic Alliance Policy Termed 'Dangerous'

90BA0019A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
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[Article by Jelena Lovric: "Between Two Fires"]

[Text] Even during the first week of the preparations for the upcoming pluralist elections, things in Croatia were so confused and almost unpredictable that some people were already wondering if they would be able to hold out until the end. If the morning shows what the rest of the day will be like, then it could be said that the Croatian dawn would be squeezed between two equivalent and mutually hostile extremes, which are not only mutually nourishing each other through hatred, but are also similar enough to be twins.

Croatia has found itself in the jaws of the antibureaucratic revolution syndrome, and moreover, of two versions of it: the one calling for the rally in Petrova Gora, after a similar attempt in Karlovac failed, and the one that was supposed to demonstrate its marching strength last weekend at the first meeting of the "most Croatian of all parties," promoting Dr. Franjo Tudjman as a counterpart to Slobodan Milosevic, as political onlookers say. It is not just that the Serbian national

program thus gained a Croatian brother—with the difference that one was born from a position of power, and the other from the opposition, but that by no means has to be a handicap for it under the given conditions—but that those two twins are clashing not so much in the political arena of Yugoslavia, as in Croatia, above all.

Although that analogy may appear a strained one, even a simple comparison allows easily identifying identical points, from political strategy and tactics to specific moves in everyday politics, from the very essence to the iconography, from the fundamental frame of reference to significant details—it is all the same option, which has been called the policy of the antibureaucratic revolution here for some time, but which does not change its true meaning even when it presents itself as its own fierce enemy. The explosive mixture of ethnic exclusivism and nationalist populism—a chauvinist farce in which there are accumulated emotionally charged verbal rivalries over national suffering, historical injustices, victims and Übermensch! The combination of totalitarian militancy and Bolshevik unanimity which seeks the kind of party organization in which, on one hand, there will be a single wise leader, a teacher, general, chieftain, and fuhrer, and on the other hand, there will be the frustrated masses, which only delude themselves through the mantric repetition of emotional slogans, and turn themselves into cannon fodder.

Both policies, arbitrarily referred to here as the eastern and western variants, have their rational core: one originated from the sufferings of Serbs in Kosovo and the illogical Serbian constitutional system, and the other originated from the threat that the Serbian national program represents for Croatia and from the even more remote problem of the Croatian emigrants, the long proscribed topic of the national suppression of the Croatian people, and the price that was paid in the 1970's, when both weeds and plants that could have bloomed were cut down in the same harsh manner. On both sides, those problems also have a very crucial economic foundation, in economic backwardness and social tensions.

Policy of Dangerous Intentions

That is where their rationalism ends, however, and they sink in dangerous waters. Both policies, in their sectarian exclusivism, yearn for enemies: one for the Albanians who threaten it, and the other for Milosevic, who threatens it. Instead of a policy of national emancipation, however, they offer nationalist recipes that can by no means be viewed as going too far with a policy of national equality and as raising it to a higher potential, but rather only as its destruction and its opposite. In doing so, they do not even shrink from falsifying history. Just as Milosevic claimed that there was nothing but treason in Serbian history from Tsar Lazar to himself, thus wiping out the glorious Serbian rebel past, including the partisan battles, and insulting most of all the very people in whose name he was speaking, Tudjman likewise, with his incomprehensible assertion that the NDH

[Independent State of Croatia] was "a form of the realization of the longstanding aspirations of the Croatian people for independence," insulted the people in whose name he claimed to speak. Thus, as has already been said, "the sinister theses about the genocidal nature of the Croatian people gained one more advocate." In the civilized world, it is not remembered that the Quisling creatures justified themselves in that way. The Ustasa ideas find an alibi in the Cetnik offers, and just as on one side they play the card of and stir up ambitions concerning a Greater Serbia, on Tudjman's side they are now advocating a Croatia "within its historical and natural borders," while not concealing their claims against Bosnia, completely in line with that well-known thesis about the Moslems as the "flower of the Croatian people," and synchronized with the statement by Vojislav Seselj, who claimed a few days ago that only Serbs—of different religions—live in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Both projects suffer from xenophobia, dissatisfied with the size of their own nations, for which the Serbs blame Albanian women who give birth too much, and Tudjman's followers blame Croatian women who have too few children. The conclusion: stop the Albanians from giving birth, and do everything possible for the production of Croatians, regardless of what the women think about this.

That functionalization of women and their conversion into machines for giving birth is only one type of the intolerance that was expressed at Tudjman's political "happening." Any different opinions were met there with such a deafening persecution that it is difficult to believe that this was a political party that wanted to function in a democratic environment. In this regard, it is indicative that the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] members could not listen in a civilized manner to even the slightest veneer of "the message of peace, fraternity, and love towards their Serbian brothers," to whom they tried in the end to cover up and amnesty all those furious statements which led their vampiric dance for two days under old Croatian flags, discrediting both those symbols and the ones that they placed in such an atmosphere. It does not matter now whether they were shrieking in intolerance at addressing the Serbian brothers or at the reference to Yugoslavia as a homeland. At the level of the presentation of that policy of "dangerous intentions," which is essentially intolerant and exclusive, there was so much similarity with the [Serbian] rallies (whose operating mechanisms we have become quite familiar with in the past few months) that it is incomprehensible that a political party, regardless of its political beliefs, which pretends to seriousness and some sort of dignity, can use such a discredited model. People did not demand weapons and call for deaths, but so much foaming intolerance and thirst for revenge was shown that that can be perceived as only a minor stylistic difference. The euphoria with which people jumped to their feet, with which they did not cease clapping, with which they showed their strength, with which, regardless of the words, they sought triumph and revanchism, which removed any different opinions from the podium,

which embraced the flags, and knelt on the ground with farcical pathos, turned the HDZ gathering into a provincial tavern and an anachronistic political ritual similar to the one that was seen last several months ago in Romania, during the last congress of the "Conducator." It is astonishing that, just as at the rallies, they did not succeed or even try to create even the appearance of democratic relations, not just in communication, but also in internal party organization, including the election of the party leaders. Tudjman did not have any opposing candidate, not even one who would have served as a democratic ornament, and those leaders, including Tudjman, were elected by acclamation. It is hard to believe in the democracy espoused by an organization that is neither willing nor able to subject itself to even such a minimal democratic test. It was a farce worthy of the most rigid times of communist orthodoxy, when democratic manners were considered bourgeois stupidity. Only bosses are still elected in such a manner. We thought that democracy in Croatia had assimilated that basic democratic prerequisite, and that no political organization aiming at participation in political competition would ignore the criterion of democracy in such a manner. It is difficult to believe in the democratic intentions of a party which practices authoritarianism in its own operation, just as it is difficult to believe in the sincerity of its support for a law-governed state, when it has violated the country's legal system with the heraldry it has displayed.

A Pig in a Poke

The Croatian voters thus received their first lesson in a practical multiparty system, which may be of great benefit to them: it is not enough to judge the real profile of a political party just on the basis of its program documents, because it is easy to be democratic and progressive on paper. It is only in practical action that one's real face is shown. There may be a discrepancy between the program's declarations and the real steps taken. In the next elections, however, the voters will have a hard time not buying a pig in a poke, because the newly formed parties are still presenting themselves on the level of their lovely desires—that is why their programs are so similar—while their real future policy is a great unknown. This is not just because it is difficult to realize a declaration, but also because some parties are now deliberately misrepresenting themselves. Somewhat more is only known about the real activities of the communists. It is hard to say whether that will favor them or their opponents.

Along with Tudjman's selection as the candidate for Croatian leader, there was so much opposition to his candidacy that it can be said that the chances of the HDZ, until now the strongest opposition party, are less than they were before their political striptease. Dressed in the splendid attire of their mass vestments, they were much more acceptable, but when they took it off, it was suddenly seen that what was being offered was already well worn, and pulled out of some old junk room. The first to react, the day after the assembly, was the LC

[League of Communists], feeling its "obligation, not as a party, and still less as a party in power, but rather as part of the democratic public, to rise up in defense of the Croatian people," refusing to have the NDH cuckoo's egg placed in its nest. "Racan's party" is being criticized in some quarters for not taking a position on such an offer earlier, because it could have been sensed even from some previous speeches by the HDZ's leaders. Those who understand political affairs, however, say that it was done at the best possible moment. Nevertheless, regardless of whether it was due to inertia or political wisdom which knows that fruit should not be picked while it is green, that LC statement had a calming effect on the political climate in Croatia. It was more important to Tudjman's potential supporters, however, that Cardinal Kuharic, perhaps a bit indirectly, but publicly, disassociated himself from support for such a policy, showing a noteworthy inclination to have the Church stand aside during the preelection struggles. Some women's organizations announced that they were horrified by the possibility that Tudjman might win the elections. He has been most discredited, however, by the fact that some of his close colleagues have opened their eyes, and are not keeping quiet about it.

The question, however, is how long the public's attitude of rejection will last. Under the conditions of a multi-party system, especially during the period before the elections, each day brings some surprise. The question is whether that attitude will change in the wake of the rally at Petrova Gora, where the ethnic assault troops will go out onto the political stage under Serbian banners, gaining an occasion for their promised escalation and an alibi that they had hardly expected (but they were preparing for rallies even before this was scheduled). With their fervor, insisting again on their Serbian cause in the heart of Croatia, won't they now stir up those national feelings that Tudjman cooled with his excessive Croatian nationalism? Couldn't someone then organize a Croatian rally against those who are offering us their Serbian antibureaucratic prescription, and then the threatened Serbs could hold rallies again? And so on indefinitely? Will Croatia thus be continually driven crazy, driven to that line planned by the usurpers of its stability? Not one nationalist party can stand peace in Croatia, and its continuation on the still fragile course of reform through which it is becoming an increasingly more significant factor in Yugoslavia. Tudjman's policy has shown that there are those here as well who, regardless of their own desires, would very easily turn "LIJEPĂ NASA" [reference to Croatian anthem] into an overheated Kosovo, just as it has shown that in the event that Tudjman's policy wins the elections, that would most of all suit that policy which without it, would soon have to acknowledge that it lightly made rash promises. And one more thing: if the HDZ's policy wins, Croatia would soon be isolated in Yugoslavia, just as only Serbia is at this time, not because anyone hates it, but because through its unconcealed threats it would force everyone else to keep their distance. Agitated Bosnians have already justifiably spoken up after Tudjman's meeting.

Already Seen

For the time being, the other political parties in Croatia are not taking a position on the HDZ's political "happening." There are views, however, that its nationalist fury was not provoked solely by the fact that Tudjman, in gathering money throughout the world, also understood certain obligations and orders that he had to fulfill, but also by the nervousness caused by the fact that on the eve of the meeting, it was announced that a group of parties had formed a "Coalition of National Agreement" with formerly prominent Croatian politicians: Savko Dabcevic-Kucar, Ivan Supek, Miko Tripalo, Dragutin Harami, and Srecko Bijelic. It is difficult to speak of any closeness among their programs, because some of those parties have a leftist orientation, such as the Social Democratic Party, for instance, while others, such as the Christian Democrats, for example, are allegedly further to the right than Tudjman. These are smaller parties which felt that they could have a chance in the election only if they put forward strong candidates, and in these times the aura of political martyrdom fetches a high price. It is claimed that some time ago that diverse bloc of parties offered Tudjman a coalition, but with the self-confidence of the strongest, he arrogantly refused. Afterwards, again allegedly, they rejected him. Tudjman does not have strong people, and from the way in which he seeks the position of leader, it seems that he could not tolerate them. One more characteristic that has already been seen!

The communists have not yet come out with their list of candidates, but in their preelection document, they asserted that they would be represented by new people, thus indicating that they also wanted to stress the absence of continuity with the former party policy. It could thus happen that the main competition in the elections will be between former and present communists (Tudjman, naturally, is one of the former communists). The present communists are going into the elections under the burden of their rule to date, which has been a liability for many of them.

Even though many of them in that organization today are not responsible for that, it will be difficult for them to avoid that negative image. The former communists are going in with considerable capital as political martyrs. Will that be enough, however? Those who like to quote world experiences point out that in Czechoslovakia's "velvet revolution," for example, Dubcek's charisma, although undeniable, could not compete with Havel, so that as a former leader, he obtained a noteworthy but nevertheless secondary role. Also pointed out is the example of Vica Vukovic, who still sings splendidly, but after the initial euphoria, no longer gets the same response as in the first few days. Will the free appearance by Croatia's former leaders reduce their magnetic attraction? Naturally, that depends most of all on their personal abilities.

Nevertheless, all of them, both former and present communists (except for Tudjman, who stubbornly

insists that he will be the winner) consistently repeat that the most important thing now is to make a peaceful transition from monism to pluralism, and to carry out that historic change in such a way that it will not entail any danger of states of emergency, political tensions, or even worse solutions. Democracy also includes the existence of Tudjman's party. That is why any ban would

have a counterproductive effect, turning him into a victim, which would make any future appearance by him even more traumatic. These are serious times, and each of the almost 3.5 million voters who will elect those to whom they will give their trust a month from now has a great responsibility. It will probably be possible to say then that the people have the government they deserve.

POLAND

Soviet Troop Conduct in Poland Evaluated; New Guidelines Warranted

90EP0445A Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI
in Polish 1 Mar 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Gen. Div. Mieczyslaw Debicki, government spokesman for the stationing of Soviet troops in Poland, with an unidentified PAP journalist; place and date not given: "The Soviet Army in Poland; The Need To Amend Its Legal Status"—first paragraph is ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI introduction]

[Text] The stationing of Soviet military units in Poland generates much emotion in Polish society. Gen. Div. Mieczyslaw Debicki, the government's plenipotentiary for matters concerning the sojourn of Soviet forces in Poland, discusses with a PAP journalist the problems associated with this and his role in resolving these problems.

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] General, what is your role and job as the government's plenipotentiary?

[Debicki] Above all I implement the tasks outlined in the agreement on the legal status of Soviet forces stationed in Poland, maintaining continuous contact with the plenipotentiary of the USSR government. I am also authorized to regulate all questions associated with the movement of Soviet forces on Polish territory, to give opinions on drafts of new legal acts and on amendments while the agreement is being executed, to supervise the operation and maintenance of facilities leased by the Soviet forces, and to record real estate as well as engineering and building equipment. I collaborate with the pertinent ministries, bureaus and governors in the realm of planning and realizing investment and remodeling projects; protecting the environment of areas used by Soviet forces; organizing rail transportation; developing roads, sidings and port basins; and utilizing communications resources and the financial accounting for the use of these resources. I conduct joint meetings with the plenipotentiary of the USSR government and direct the work of the mixed Polish-Soviet commission. In addition, I monitor the realization of commitments made by the Soviets in the realm of rectifying damages caused during their army maneuvers, exercises and movements. I also review complaints of citizens and institutions of the Republic of Poland concerning the violation of their rights by personnel of the Soviet forces.

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] The very enumeration of these tasks indicate that you have your hands full. Readers would be interested in an answer to the question: What problems arise as the result of stationing Soviet forces in Poland, and what is the Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Government of the Republic of Poland doing to resolve these problems?

[Debicki] Soviet units utilize primarily facilities that were built in the 1930's that are equipped in accordance

with the requirements of those times and that are connected to local sewer systems or that contain their own treatment equipment. This equipment, especially in the air force garrisons (Brzeg, Chojna, Kluczewo, Szprotawa, Zagan, Krzywa, Bagicza and Legnica) are not always operated properly and have deteriorated markedly, and some of them cannot even be repaired. They contaminate cultivated land and forests with petroleum-based products and imperil surface and underground water. It is becoming rapidly necessary to regulate water connections and to build sewage treatment plants. Initial agreements have been reached in these matters at meetings of the plenipotentiaries of both governments with interested governors. The Soviet side is obligated to finance these projects.

Most of the Soviet garrisons possess their own boiler rooms, laundries and bakeries that are not equipped with filters and dust-extraction equipment. They are sources of air pollution and are burdensome for the local residents. These problems are especially severe in Swidnica, Brzeg and Swinoujscie. Large financial outlays are required to resolve these problems. Presently dust extraction equipment is installed only in the boiler rooms of the Soviet Army in Swidnica.

Problems associated with the operation of airfields, especially in Szprotawa and Brzeg, are increasing. It appears that heavy aircraft should not be based at airfields located near cities. I proposed to the commander of the Northern Group of the Soviet Army that the air force units in Brzeg be transferred to other airfields. Much damage is done to communities located near flight paths because of the acoustic effects associated with aircraft speeds exceeding the sound barrier; this applies especially to Kluczbork, Czestochowa and Radomsko. The local PZUs [State Insurance Bureaus] are responsible for settling claims as a result of these damages.

There have been incidences of commanders of Soviet Army units violating regulations concerning the management of forests and of Soviet Army personnel violating hunting regulations in areas used by the Soviets. We often receive complaints about Soviet-soldier hunters violating hunting regulations and ethics; they poach and even use machine guns. In March of this year a working meeting will be held between representatives of the command of the Northern Group of the Soviet Army and representatives of local administrations and governments at which actions to be undertaken this year by both sides to improve the management of forests and to decrease the number of forest fires will be established.

There are a certain number of empty housing units (often very neglected or even devastated) in the Soviet garrisons located in cities. As a result of pressure from our side, 250 housing units and barracks were transferred to local administration organs and the Silesian Military District. The Soviets are obligated to transfer additional buildings this year.

We have also noted that Soviet units are late in paying their bills for supplies, construction and remodeling work, communal services and other obligations.

In the large garrisons (Swidnica, Brzeg and Legnica) there have been incidences of Soviet soldiers violating Polish law-and-order regulations.

There have been incidences of robbery, burglary, plundering and thievery. Vehicle collisions and accidents happen often. This creates an unfavorable climate in our society, especially since our police and local governments often did not take appropriate action in the past to enforce the observance of our legal regulations. This generates discontent and exasperation and even to active assaults on USSR citizens and soldiers. For example, during a 350 kilometer exercise march, a column of Soviet forces was pelted 21 times with rocks, bottles and so forth.

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] Concerning damages, who is responsible for them, and who pays?

[Debicki] In accordance with Article 3 of the Agreement on the Legal Status of Soviet Forces Temporarily Stationed in Poland, the regulations of Polish law apply when resolving problems associated with the stationing of Soviet forces in Poland. Thus material damages caused by Soviet forces are compensated either via conciliation or by the PZU which, in turn, requests a refund from the Soviets for the payment of our compensation via the mixed Polish-Soviet commission. In past years many payments for damages were late in coming. Lately, however, these late payments decreased significantly. Every citizen's claim should be settled within the obligatory time specified by the PZU.

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] Are there any thoughts about changing or amending the regulations concerning the temporary stationing of Soviet forces on Polish territory?

[Debicki] The basic legal act defining the status of Soviet forces is the agreement between the Polish and Soviet governments that was signed in 1956. Respecting the sovereignty and independence of Poland is emphasized in the regulations of this agreement. They obligate the Soviet side to respect and observe the regulations of Polish law. In Paragraph 1 of Article 9, both sides agreed that perpetrators of crimes and offenses would be subject to Polish jurisdiction; it also stipulated that the Soviets would have the right to prosecute perpetrators of crimes against the Soviet Union and individuals belonging to the Soviet forces and members of their families.

These kinds of limitations are reasonable and leave no room for doubt. After all, they are analogous to the pacts and agreements concluded, for example, between the United States and Great Britain and other NATO countries.

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] What about perpetrators of offenses that we consider minor?

[Debicki] To improve the legal protection of our citizens, I believe perpetrators of minor offenses that harm Polish society should also be subject to Polish jurisdiction, even if committed during the execution of service duties.

The law's regulations and executory acts concerning the rules for using various facilities and services by Soviet units should also be changed fundamentally because the obligatory agreement was concluded over 34 years ago under different economic and political conditions.

It is necessary to change the regulations defining the use of terrains, arable land and forest land on the basis of payments, using the currently obligatory leasing rates for all real estate; to implement regulations to observe the mechanisms of a market economy; to assure equality of natural persons or legal entities in obligatory relations; to implement rules requiring the payments in obligatory domestic prices for services and supplies of food, industrial articles and building materials to Soviet forces; and payments in accordance with rules obligatory in foreign trade with the USSR for energy raw materials; and to implement the rule that charges for all types of communal services, remodeling of buildings and rework of equipment will be in accordance to obligatory domestic prices.

A new version of the intergovernment agreement has been drafted already by the Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Government of the Republic of Poland for the Sojourn of Soviet Forces in Poland, and the process of its review by interested ministries and central institutions has begun.

Goals for Effective, Uniform Air Defense Viewed 90EP0451A Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 15 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by Colonel Prof. Dr. Hab. Witold Pokruszynski, General Staff Academy: "New Aspects of Air Defense"]

[Text] There has been and is a variety of opinions about the air defense of the Republic of Poland given the new situation of the two military blocks. In recent years, two extreme positions have dominated. The first calls for a definite limitation of its capacity as part of the restructuring of the military forces and of the partial disarmament in Europe; the second calls for maintaining the existing level and a partial modernization of the air defense system. Both the first and the second positions fail to respond to the current situation and even worse do not derive from accepted doctrines. At the very outset, without going into historical considerations, it is necessary to state that the defensive strength of the state depends decisively on a strong, well-organized air defense. In order to prove this statement, it is necessary first of all to present even superficially the level of the threat to the Republic from the air.

The threat consists of many things but especially of the theory promoted in the West of "air-land war 2000" which places its chief emphasis on air power. According to the theory, air strikes during the initial period of an

armed conflict in a conventional war, given our defensive variant, could determine the course of further actions in the European theater of war.

The great significance NATO assigns to air forces is accounted for by these forces' destructive power, range of operation, precision, rapid reactions, tactical versatility, multiple uses, and the availability of smart weapons on nearly every means of attack. Another no less important factor is that the number of means of air attack which can operate from the Western strategic-air direction is still increasing, and their reach extends over the whole territory of our country. Just through 1992, in addition to the existing number of means of air attack in the European theater of war, we should expect an increase in NATO's unmanned means of air attack which are capable of destroying various objects, even ones having strong air defenses, to 20,000.

The significant jump in the fighting capabilities of the combined NATO air forces, including the means of air attack, especially using smart weapons, improved forms and methods of battle use, and the level of battle readiness give us reason to conclude that the potential opponent after only a partial mobilization under the guise of an exercise can begin war operations with the aid of conventional arms with a rocket and air attack over the full depth of the operational groups of the military and on objects in the far rear.

Taking into consideration the great threat and the defensive character of our doctrine which prohibits us from beginning military operations first and from executing any anticipatory strikes, it is necessary immediately to reveal the role of the air defense of the Republic of Poland in the press in the new, difficult situation in which it finds itself. The difficulty results chiefly from the need to conduct large antiaircraft battles with the overwhelming forces of the opponent. The repelling of massed strikes by the enemy from the air, especially in the initial phases of armed conflict, will depend not only on the number and quality of the air defense forces, but also on other factors, i.e., battle readiness of the forces, their reaction times, effectiveness of their operations, the structures of air defense and the ways of using the forces, and the quality of the commanders.

Obviously if the significance of air defense increases (as point 5 of the Defense Doctrine of the Republic of Poland shows), then the demands made upon the air defense will change. They are a product of the existing level and direction of the threat, the goals of air defense, the accepted conception for conducting defense operations on the territory of the country by operational forces, and the general plans concerning the conduct of antiaircraft operations in a large tactical unit of the air command within the alliance system.

Among the demands placed upon contemporary air defense are:

—the ability to destroy enemy means of air attack from every direction of the threat at every altitude of their flight;

- the ability to concentrate air-defense efforts in the fundamental direction and around basic objects;
- high efficiency of air defense;
- the ability constantly to act upon the enemy to the full depth of the defense;
- the ability effectively to combat means of air attack under strong radio-electronic disturbances.

Taking into account the conditions for conducting air defense on the territory of the Republic of Poland and in light of the growing threat from the air, it should be said that a modern air defense should be unified, effective, maneuverable, and durable.

Even a superficial evaluation of the existing situation shows that Poland's air defense is not capable of meeting the listed demands.

The need to create a unified system of air defense in Poland is required for objective reasons, chiefly because of the character of the actions of the defensive operational forces, the need to protect our own and allied forces regrouping on Polish territory along an east-west axis, the usefulness of combining protection of the military with air defense of objects, and also the ability to execute strikes from the air during the first hours of armed conflict, as part of the enemy's first attacking air operations.

The anticipated character of the operations of the enemy's means of air attack and the character of our own forces in defensive operations show that for air defense—at the operational scale—the directions of the threat and the regions, the belts, and lines of air defense as well as the tasks during the initial and successive antiaircraft operations will be joint.

Air defense on the territory of the Republic of Poland should chiefly perform such tasks as destroying the principal groups of the means of air attack at a distance on approach, beyond the boundaries of the country and the protected objects, concentrating the air-defense efforts on the main directions of the threat and defense of the most important objects, conducting battle operations over the entire depth of the operational groups of the operational forces, and distributing the objects over the area of the country.

The complexity of these operations leads to these reflections, especially now, when extreme views on the usefulness of the development of air defense to modern world standards are beginning to crystallize. And modern air defense consists primarily of modern means of fighting and commanding and bold views on the structure of defense.

It appears to be high time objectively, without emotion, boldly and substantively to analyze the problem of the air defense of the Republic of Poland from the point of view of current doctrine and of today in light of the

long-term development of the means of air and space attack through the end of the century.

Returning to the statement made at the beginning of the article, I wish to remind the reader that those countries which had not solved the problem of air defense prior to the second world war capitulated during the first weeks of operations. Thus, in closing, I am not afraid to say that in any armed conflict in Europe operations in the third

dimension, i.e., in the air and in space, and not as heretofore on land and sea, will take on overriding significance.

In order to meet the tasks of the new doctrine, we must stay ahead in thinking and in actions of the essence and mechanisms of air defense since future battle fields will be increasingly demanding and brutal for the lazy and incompetent.

POLAND**British ICL Computers Installed in Polish Banks**

*90EP0491A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
8 Mar 90 p 2*

[Article by A.S.: "State-of-the-Art Computers for Banks"]

[Text] Over 20 years ago we began with the rather simple "Odra" computer system. Today some banks, including PKO SA and PKP BP, are already using the modern equipment produced by International Computers, Limited (ICL). This year these computers will be installed in the Wielkopolski Bank, the Western Industrial Trade Bank. But actually we are still a long way from real modernity in our banks.

In order to acquaint Polish bankers with the computer equipment now being produced by ICL and to present their offer to them, the English firm arranged a seminar. On Thursday, at the Marriott Hotel, over 100 vice presidents and department directors responsible for computer operations in their banks, met. The participants could form their own opinion as to what the state of the art is in Western banks.

During the seminar, the firm Sofbank, which collaborates in Poland with ICL by supplying software for the English computers, also presented its offer.

Turkish Foreign Trade Mission Seeks Closer Economic Ties

*90EP0487B Warsaw RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish
No 31, 20 Mar 90 p 7*

[Article by AK: "Turkish Mission in Poland"]

[Text] A mission comprised of a few dozen people, organized by the Federation of Turkish Chambers of Commerce and Commodity Exchanges, visited Poland recently. It was headed up by president of this organization, Ali Osman Ulusoy, and was made up of representatives of many industrial and commercial firms, banks, tourist societies, and government institutions responsible for foreign economic cooperation.

The purpose of the visit was to examine the possibility of increasing the economic ties linking both countries under the new conditions which now exist in Poland. The statements made by members of the mission, just as those expressed earlier by Turkish government representatives, clearly show that our partners on the Bosphorus have accepted the radical change of our economy to a market one, with great satisfaction. Poland, which has for years been linked to Turkey by relatively strong economic ties, has now become an even more attractive partner.

It should be emphasized that the government in Ankara has expressed a readiness to help our country in the reform process, as shown by the credit granted by the

Turkish Export-Import Bank in the amount of \$100 million, which can be doubled at Poland's request.

During a meeting at the headquarters of the Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade (PIHZ), the members of the Turkish mission became acquainted with the liberalization of the economic system in our country, and particularly the intent to privatize the state sector, the principles of investment by foreign entrepreneurs and the creation of joint ventures, the new financial regulations, and organizational changes pertaining to the economic chambers.

Representatives of Turkish firms then held detailed talks with representatives of Polish production and trade enterprises, talks which in part were a continuation of former cooperation, and in part were of an exploratory nature.

The mission members visited the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation, the Agency for Foreign Investment, and the Export Development Bank, where the possibility of increasing and diversifying the present contacts was discussed. Representatives of Turk Ekonomii Bankasi and Pamukbank entered into an agreement on cooperation with the Export Development Bank.

The Turkish side also expressed a desire to renew contacts with PIHZ and said that there would be greater participation than heretofore in this year's International Trade Fairs in Poznan. Following this mission there would be others, smaller in number, arriving in Poland to discuss specific matters and transactions. Soon our country will also be visited by a delegation of Turkish bankers to discuss the ability of the Poles to utilize the credit granted them.

It was agreed that representatives of our enterprises will also visit Turkey and present their offer to the commercial-trade circles there. The conference to take place in Istanbul during the latter half of March, devoted to the possibility of Polish-Turkish cooperation, will be especially interesting. This will be an opportunity to present concrete proposals to our partners pertaining to coproduction and the creation of joint ventures.

The chances for joint ventures are quite good, considering the interest of the Turkish firms in this type of cooperation, especially in various branches of industry and in tourism.

Innovative Aspects of Free Trade Zones, Bonded Warehouses Viewed

*90EP0470A Warsaw RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish
No 29, 13 Mar 90 p 8*

[Article by Monika Sowa: "A Few Comments on Free Trade Zones and Bonded Warehouses"]

[Text] Last year, for the first time, free trade zones and bonded warehouses appeared on the Polish economic

landscape. What do they look like today, after the first months of operation? How is this new form of connection with foreign countries developing?

Let us begin with the reminder that a free trade zone is a specifically delineated part of the Polish trade area, regarded as foreign territory, on which economic activity can be conducted by Polish, foreign and international economic entities. So states the customs law dated 28 December 1989, Art. 31, pt. 2. In common parlance, within the borders of a free trade zone no duty is collected on goods brought into Poland from abroad. No other allowances or reductions are granted and normal domestic laws apply.

The Council of Ministers has the right to establish a free trade zone by decree. In 1989, two such decrees were issued, on 22 June and 17 July, setting up 13 free trade zones in: Darlowo, Kolobrzeg, Szczecin, Swinoujscie, Goleniow, Kolbaskowo, Gryfino, Brochow, Sulechow, Wroclaw, Kedzierzyn Kozle, Gliwice, Ustka, Terespol, and Poznan.

As reported by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation [MWGzZ], no large-scale (or on any scale) service or production activity is conducted in these zones, nor has it been possible to attract foreign capital to them. These zones function mainly as bonded warehouses. However, the stock companies registered in most of the zones (Free Trade Zone Szczecin Stock Company, Silesian Free Trade Zone Gliwice-Kedzierzyn Kozle Stock Company, etc.) are showing great activity.

The unsatisfactory results of operations in free trade zones can be attributed to a combination of different factors. First of all, many of the initiators of these zones were not at all concerned with obtaining tariff reliefs, because these are too small to attract foreign investors, but with the creation of special economic zones. These zones exist in many developing countries and entice foreign capital with the help of tax abatements, favorable labor legislation, easy transfer of profits, etc., to say nothing of a good geographical location and a well-developed technical infrastructure.

The creation of a special economic zone with a separate—in relation to the rest of the country—system of laws dealing with economics, is impossible in Poland right now in view of the absence of applicable laws. The MWGzZ fears the following: We will lease a piece of Poland to foreign capital which will employ people for 10 or more hours a day at wages lower than those paid in the West. Is this what we really want? The position of the regional initiators of the free trade zones on this question is completely different. They see these zones as a remedy for all of the local problems. But as long as the “central authorities” make it difficult to create a special economic zone, they will establish a free trade zone, while dreaming of something else.¹

This is a problem of large and strong, well-located and well-developed free trade zones, such as Szczecin. Other zones cannot blame their snail-paced development on the MWGzZ. Their location—far less attractive than Szczecin—and the lack of a technical infrastructure,

means that their chances of quickly drawing large foreign capital to them are not very good.

The idea of a free trade zone, as a matter of fact, is based throughout the world on two advantages: easy access to foreign investors (close to a large, efficient airport or seaport—even an inactive one), and infrastructure: developed land, a ready production floor available for leasing, good communication with the world, etc. The foreign investor drops off semifinished products, or rather products which are finished but still lack labels and must be packaged, and after they are given “final processing” wants to ship them further. Most Polish free trade zones cannot yet fulfill these requirements. Furthermore, the “fashion” for free trade zones has led to the formation of an excessively large number of them, resulting in unnecessary competition among already reluctant foreign investors. As a result, right now we have trade zones operating as bonded warehouses, and stock companies—the organizers of these zones—which do not really need tariff preferences in order to operate, but do need the initiative and enterprise which would permit them to stimulate the economy in that region.

Let us now go on to the bonded warehouse, or as stated in Art. 31, pt. 2, of the above-mentioned law, “the specifically delineated part of the Polish trade zone, regarded as foreign territory, on which economic entities which have their offices in Poland can store their goods or do consigning, finishing, packaging, processing, assembling or repairing.” The goods placed in a bonded warehouses can be stored there for a period of 3 years (the director of the applicable local customs office can extend this period, but by no more than 12 months).

Last year MWGzZ issued approximately 500 permits for setting up and operating a bonded warehouse (a modest treasury fee of 1,240 was charged). Starting with the new year, the issuance of permits was assigned to the Main Customs Office [GUC], and the fee was raised to 50,000 zlotys. During the last 2 weeks of January, approximately 300 applications were pending at GUC, some of them submitted by the Ministry. It may be said, therefore, that soon we will have more bonded warehouses than foreign-currency exchange desks.

But what is most interesting is that most of the bonded warehouses set up last year were not involved at all in finishing or consignment work, but only in storage of goods. Why? Well, on 25 March 1989, the National Bank of Poland stopped issuing permits for sales of imported goods in Poland for foreign exchange (except for automobile spare parts and the like). Given this, many Polish economic entities, interested in establishing yet another prospering foreign-currency shop in our country, began to think about how to bypass this obstacle. And establishing a bonded warehouse turned out to be an excellent solution. A customer who buys a machine or computer in such a warehouse, for example, pays the purchase price for the goods in foreign currency directly into the account of the foreign firm, brings proof of payment to the warehouse, where he receives the goods, paying only the customs fee and the

commission (in zlotys). The foreign-exchange element in this transaction is completely absent.

The warehouses turned out to be the cheapest form of importing Western goods into the country. A normal foreign-currency shop of the PEWEX type, (i.e., operating on the basis of a permit for sales in the country in return for foreign currency) was, until the end of last year, required to resell, at the official exchange rate, 25 percent of its foreign-exchange receipts. Hence the high margins (and therefore also the noncompetitive prices) in PEWEX, amounting to as much as one-third the value of the goods. The owner of the bonded warehouse was not required to do this. If he collected his margin (profit) in zlotys, then he paid only tax on it and did not need to overstate it, as was the case in PEWEX. If he took the money in foreign currency, then true, he resold 80 percent to the state, but even so this was profitable. With attractive product prices and a low profit margin he had very good sales and keeping 20 percent of the foreign currency earned meant a great deal.

In other words, the development of bonded warehouses turned out in practice to be the expansion of a network of cheap foreign-currency shops. At one time, the legal department of MWGzZ "reminded" many owners of bonded warehouses that in advertising their centers, and thus the firms which are selling the products, they are going beyond the competence of a bonded warehouse and are encroaching into representative services (agencies) in behalf of a given foreign firm. Thus a large part of those operating bonded warehouses now also have agency rights. On the other hand, an opposite trend could also be seen. Many agencies decided to try to get a permit to operate a bonded warehouse. In October, MWGzZ took a very radical step. It stopped issuing permits for the establishing of bonded warehouses releasing goods to individuals.

In the new economic reality, bonded warehouses are almost completely inactive. Many of the owners questioned reported that they had stopped importing foreign goods until executive regulations are issued to the new laws and until they "learn more" about the new situation. Some announced that they were closing the warehouse because demand has dropped in connection with the standardization of customs duties for legal entities and individuals and the increase of duties on consumer goods. It is also worth mentioning that on 10 December 1989 MWGzZ prohibited the acceptance for storage of alcohol products in bonded warehouses. But it appears that the foreign-currency warehouses' basic trump card is this: sales of Western goods for foreign currency will again become attractive, especially since the government has ordered the foreign-currency shops to gradually begin to sell for zlotys. But this will be only until the zloty really becomes a hard currency.

It should be mentioned that the new foreign currency law permits still one more form of economic activity with the prefix "customs," i.e., an agency (Art. 116). Agencies would be entitled to the rights of customs offices, i.e., offer services in behalf of other organizational units

(buying and selling goods abroad), functions relating to customs supervision, and customs inspection. The conditions for the establishing and functioning of customs agencies (which of the large importers would not like to have one on its own premises!) will be determined by MWGzZ by way of a decree and we will try to inform you of this immediately.

Footnote

¹But it should be added that the Ministry of Foreign Trade in Austria recently submitted an official proposal to the Polish government on the creation of a special economic zone in the Szczecin-Swinoujscie region, calculated at between a few and several billion dollars. The matter will be settled this year. The zone will probably receive additional tax abatements, including reduction of taxes and extension of the period of exemption from taxes, and special guarantees relating to stabilization of the economic system in Poland. But on condition that other foreign economic organizational units (in addition to Austrian) will also be permitted to operate in this zone. Representatives of the governments of the FRG, Sweden, and some Far East countries, have also expressed interest in the creation of special economic zones in Poland.

Social Benefits Package for Private Farmers Defended

90EP0491E Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
7 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by Edmund Szot: "A Good Interim Arrangement"]

[Text] The "Law on Social Benefits for Private Farmers and Their Families in 1990," passed on 24 February by the Sejm and ratified on 2 March by the Senate, has evoked completely unwarranted anxiety among some residents of the countryside.

"It is not an ideal law," said Arthur Balazs, minister without portfolio for rural health, education and social concerns, at a press conference, "but every point of this law introduces changes which are to the benefit of farmers."

The share of the farmers' contribution to the creation of a retirement fund has shrunk from 33 percent last year to 17 percent this year. The maternity benefit is being increased to 120,000 zlotys (from 2,500!), and the minimum pension and annuity is being increased to 250,000 zlotys. A complete valorization of all benefits will take place.

However, farmers (just as some senators and deputies) are disturbed by the size of the contributions, which indeed are going up very considerably (although not in relation to the amount of the annuity), and by the way they are being established. Namely, farmers pay 480,000 zlotys a year per person, and an additional 78,000 zlotys for every conversion hectare. They are required to pay this second part of the contribution only up to the amount of 2.5 million zlotys—above that amount the

contribution is voluntary. If the retirement contribution were to be made up of only one portion, then per person it would have to amount to 760,000 zlotys a year.

The requirement that the farm be bequeathed to an heir or sold (leased) should not upset the farmers either, because should there be no one to take it over the owner can continue to farm the land and still draw benefits amounting to 75 percent of his annuity. The law also provides protection for two-job persons who have lost their factory jobs. For a year, their contributions to farmers' social benefits will be refunded and in addition, they have the right to the same benefits as persons who wish to be retrained. Finally, they are able to take advantage of a nonreturnable loan of a rather considerable size.

The law provides for one more thing: All farmers who are over 75 years of age are exempted from paying the so-called individual part of the contribution.

Of course, there are also those who will continue to say that the greatest advantage of the new law is that it will be in effect only to the end of this year. Beginning next year, a completely new system of social security for farmers and their families will go into effect. It provides for the formation of a fund which is completely independent of the Social Security Agency, under the control of the agricultural organizations, with a stable and growing share of the budget in the creation of the fund. Under the new system, the amount of the annuity will depend on the size of the contribution and the present fee per hectare will then be an "investment" paid into this new annuity.

On the other hand, it can be charged that the new law is not very understandable. The entitlements to various benefits become effective at different times. Some farmers will be required to make contributions and then later will have to apply for refunds of these contributions, etc. Let us hope that next year's social security system for farmers will be more clear.

YUGOSLAVIA

Self-Management Under Law on Enterprise Discussed

90BA0007A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 18 Feb 90
pp 26-28

[Article by Milan Milosevic: "Liberalization of Self-Management"]

[Text] What is actually happening with self-management, that Yugoslav socialist experiment which established our credentials as socialist reformers? What will happen to the self-management rights to which at least 6 million Yugoslavs employed in the socialized sector have become accustomed and to the kind of security in poverty that followed from that?

The macroeconomic formula of the Yugoslav reform has two accents: the independence of the enterprise and the integral nature of the market. The pluralism of ownership and the relations built on it, the altered position of the enterprise on the market, business enterprise, the separation of politics from the economy, the unrestrained bank, the independent trade sector, and the government in the role of regulator of basic inputs through macroeconomic management of the economy—it is now felt that these are categories without which there can be no self-management; earlier, this was "capitalist alienation."

The very rapid organizational changes in the business operation of enterprises, the overcoming of autarky, the domination of knowledge and of skilled manpower, accompanied by construction of new small and medium-sized plants with marketing efficiency should, in the government's interpretation, confirm the economic efficiency of this model with relative speed.

The new philosophy of development presupposes a new political environment defined by the phrase "both pluralism and self-management." Public attention is turned for the moment to political pluralism, and little is being said about self-management, which has undergone a fair amount of development in the West. Someone said somewhere that the minimum of our aspirations might be to at least have as much pluralism as the advanced West has worker participation.

Some people refer to what is happening now to self-management legislation as "removing the guilt." The legislative package adopted these past months in the SFRY Assembly indicates a kind of liberalization of labor legislation: everything is permitted which is not expressly prohibited. Will that liberalization be used to liberate the enterprise, for freer entrepreneurial behavior, or for harassment of the workers? The trade unions are now one of the factors on which that issue largely depends.

The overregulation of self-management up to now has not been protecting the workers against harassment, but basic trade union organizations were not on the side of the workers being harassed, it is observed in an analysis of protection of self-management rights adopted last July by the Council of the Federation of Yugoslav Trade Unions.

A Representative With Immunity

In every sizable enterprise, the trade union should seek to set up its representative with immunity, to allow him to protect the interests of employees. The analysis referred to notes that all of 180,000 workers have filed grievances for infringement of their rights in just 1.5 years. The highest frequency of dissatisfaction is related to the hiring and assignment of workers, the low personal income, and the housing list. A large number of people have been simply seeking material assistance.

The battle for a higher price will certainly be waged fiercely within the enterprise and outside it. Several general strikes were announced even last fall. The proposed version of the law on strikes, which is actually a copy of Western European strike procedure, has been meeting with great resistance from the trade unions and also delegates in the Federal Chamber, who have been charging that it "vacates" the constitutional right to strike....

Collective Agreements

Collective agreements, which are supposed to be concluded between the trade unions and employers, are being established in legislation and promoted politically in order to regulate the fight over wages. This is one of the ways of establishing the price of labor. The trade union is demanding that its right to strike be included in collective agreements. Since the "ownership issue" has not yet been resolved, at this point it is not quite clear who is the "owner," the "titleholder," of social property. The strikers, however, have guessed infallibly with whom they could actually negotiate, they knew where the money was.

Collective agreements will nevertheless be "something more" than the social compacts we have had up to now, since they will probably regulate all working conditions, not merely "pay classes." Collective agreements will actually replace what the "man in the street" has understood by the term "self-management" (since a major financial decision is voted on mechanically, the transition is being made to "the real" new "self-management," the "sweat the small stuff," because of wages, of course).

In the document, which is entitled "Joint Bases for Conclusion of Collective Agreements," which was adopted by the Council of the Federation of Yugoslav Trade Unions, collective agreements regulate the conditions and manner of establishment of the employment relation, the hiring and assignment of workers, the work schedule, pauses, vacations, and absences, workplace health and safety, protection of women, personal incomes, information, worker education, the responsibility of the worker for performance of work duties, termination of the employment relation, protection of workers' rights, and settlement of disputes between the parties.

Personal income, it is proposed in this trade union checklist for collective agreements, depends on the type and complexity of the job. It may not be lower than the lowest price of labor established in the republic, adjusted by the coefficient reflecting the complexity of the job and the harshness of the work conditions. This amount increases every year. The employer must have uniform standards which he must meet. At the request of the workers, that is, the trade union, those standards may be subjected to professional arbitration.

Under the law on the enterprise, self-management is now oriented toward the more important strategic decisions. The worker caucus adopts decisions on the change in the

status of a public or mixed enterprise, the regulation on distribution of funds for personal incomes, the criteria for determination of technological redundancy, and so on. Before a decision is made in the workers' council, the caucus submits its opinion on division of profit in the enterprise, on large investment projects, on the regulation concerning employment relations, on the regulation concerning allocation of housing units....

The workers' council of the enterprise makes decisions on changing the name and line of business of the enterprise, decides on establishment of new enterprises, on the separation of parts of the enterprise, or on changing the status of the firm, it undertakes measures against parts of the enterprise in which disturbances have occurred in business operation, it decides on large investment projects, it decides on the distribution of profit, it adopts the report on workplace health and safety, and it rules in the second instance on workers' rights....

Who Is the Owner?

It still is not clear whether the workers' council is the "owner" of socially owned property. In his detailed report, Ante Markovic said last spring that there are still many problems in defining the titleholder of social property and economic responsibility for its use, although pluralism of ownership has in a practical sense been adopted in law. The government has been pointing up the particular problem that arises when socially owned property has to be sold in a case of "financial rescue" because of unsuccessful business operation. Transitional solutions have been sought that would be adopted through a "creative interpretation of the Constitution." In order to eliminate the restrictions, proposals are now being made in the new constitutional initiative for the present provisions, which define assets which are socially owned, to be deleted from the Constitution. ("The old ones are being deleted, but new ones are not being written," the lawyer Ratko Markovic explained the other day.) What is actually being demanded is that provisions be omitted from the Constitution that have to do with defining socially owned assets and prohibit acquisition of the right of ownership over those assets and which pertain to the right to work with socially owned assets, to the distribution of income and division of funds for personal incomes, and also to special protection of socially owned property.

These are attempts to clear the way for equality of different forms of property in a mixed ownership environment, to separate the governance function (upravljanje) from the supervisory function (rukovodjenje). All this must have direct consequences in the sphere of self-management. There was stormy debate before the set of laws on the market for money and capital, securities, and employment relations was passed in the Assembly. Adoption of some of those laws involved debate of some 80 amendments. This liberal reform, in Markovic's words, is a "road full of obstacles, difficulties, and problems," "there must be a great deal of denial

if we are to free ourselves of ballast, of mortgages, of the habits and legacy of the past—we must display a readiness to renounce privileges, idleness, irresponsibility, programs gone wrong, a harking back to the past, irrational ideas, and unrealistic promises," the parasitic ties to the government, and the unhampered voluntarism of the nomenclature.... These were the explanations of our prime minister at the point when the set of laws which seriously began deregulation of self-management was being defended.

The "political economy of socialism" we have had up to now has burdened the enterprise with many social welfare functions, and they have smothered the principal function, which is the productive function. The enterprise has been resolving political, social welfare, municipal service, and demographic issues (day nurseries in the factory), it has been providing housing, it has been a factor in national defense, it has been condemning the enemy, it has been helping political campaigns, and it has been waiting for help and protection from the government.

What the state has given with one hand it has completely taken away with the other—from the normative standpoint the workers had broad rights, but they did not have the wherewithal to realize them, says Milan Jovicic, adviser in the Council of the Federation of Yugoslav Trade Unions. Will it be easy to get rid of all that ballast?

Regardless of the immediate outcome, a little miracle has nevertheless taken place; a government which has not had sufficient power, which has been under the cloud of hyperinflation and has faced an angered public opinion, and a fatigued nomenclature, shattered by internal conflicts, last fall and this winter have introduced into laws many categories which only yesterday were heresy. "Unrestricted banks" as "money enterprises," "unhindered trade," a "money market," a "labor market"—many raised their hands for those "bourgeois categories" from among those in the old nomenclature who earned their pensions personally by persecuting "liberalism." What were they thinking about that?

We talked to Djuro Kovacevic, who said that the super-institutionalization of self-management coincided with (and was meant to serve) the showdown with liberalism.

The trouble with self-management was that its standards had largely been laid down in an antiliberalist environment, that a complicated system of self-management institutions had been built on the pretext of "protecting the working class" which had been used predominantly for state and party control of the enterprise, its management stratum, and the "rebellious worker potential." (For a long time, records on strikes were kept by the State Security Administration). The resolution of the everyday conflicts that occur in management was left to self-management bodies, the workers were prevented from bickering, "from eating out each other's liver" over distribution of the low price of labor and over symbolic

"bonuses." Their linkage outside the enterprise was used first to suppress the liberals through the congresses of self-managers, and then it was systematically frustrated, although at one point in Yugoslavia there was an entire movement to institute a chamber of associated labor within the SFRY Assembly.

The Law on the Enterprise and Basic Rights Arising Out of the Employment Relation, which has already been adopted, has placed Yugoslavs employed in socially owned enterprises in altogether new circumstances.

Paragovernmental "welfare" and monitoring institutions such as the self-management courts, public defenders of self-management law, and a host of other "coordinating bodies" are destined to disappear, and "rigged self-management" is to grow into something else. What we have popularly known as self-management, which was actually a battle over wages, will, it seems, be moved to the sphere of trade union struggles. "The meaning of the struggle for self-management will be moved to the area of the distribution of the newly created value," Jovicic believes.

Now, the building of market mechanisms, elimination of the heavy financial legacy, the adaptation of enterprises, banks, the trade sector, social service activities, and the government to market conditions, and the strengthening of motivation are occurring alongside the reform of the state, especially the federal state, accompanied by a broadening of human freedoms within the framework of the new system, accompanied by ethnic conflicts, a splintering of the once monolithic party, and, very important, accompanied by an obvious disintegration of the nomenclature, which is frantically trying to cover its rear by going into enterprises, to set itself up in influential positions in enterprises. We are witnesses to the last assault of the members of the nomenclature on the "winter palaces" of technocratic power.

Who Chooses the Director?

Although the law provides otherwise, the careers of enterprise directors are still beginning and ending in offices outside enterprises. The technomanagerial stratum, pruned in the seventies, has never recovered nor become independent of the party nomenclature. The actual owner of the Yugoslav enterprise in the socialized sector is thus still the party state (although that party seems to be falling apart). And we are now living in an "intermission."

It seems like a good time for the "nomenclature"; the powers of directors have been increased, workers' duties have been defined more strictly, and the trade unions, which are supposed to become a kind of "guard" against powerful harassment, have never prepared themselves for the new role. Still, here again one senses the feverishness of the preparations; it is no accident that independent trade unions are springing up all over the homeland, and even those that exist are announcing that they will become independent. The present-day trade union is displaying a radicalism which could not have

even been dreamed of earlier. The trade union, we were told by M. Jovicic, is preparing to negotiate with the employers, with the enterprises, with the state, with the political parties in the name of its members. He believes that sooner or later the trade unions will be unified in some form. He feels that what actually lies ahead is a struggle among political parties for the nod of the trade unions.

The workers have still not become aware that they have a right to choose the director. Milan Jovicic, adviser in the Council of the Federation of Trade Unions, told NIN: "The position of the professional management team is changing, it must be concerned about the enterprise, not about the government. This presupposes that the workers choose it. The basic right of the workers to independently choose their managers, that is actually a new right, and many other rights have been held up only because there will be a long and difficult struggle for them. That struggle will become complicated, since all participants will enter it on an equal footing, which will be on the basis of work and on the basis of capital."

Along with the conflicts over wages and salaries, the "battle for the director" might signify self-management in the coming period. In keeping with the altered role of the director as a businessman, his authorities have been broadened to include decisions on individual rights, duties, and responsibilities of workers. A provision has been adopted, for example, whereby the director may influence a decision on a choice of applicants by making a recommendation of people for positions in professional management. This gives the director the opportunity to influence the election of the professional management team which will help him in organizing and directing the work process. During debate of the law, an objection was, however, honored to the effect that it would be inadvisable for the professional management to submit an opinion concerning the choice of all workers.

Since the director's position is affected by many immediate interests, it would be logical to expect that employed Yugoslavs would realize the sensitive importance of this position.

The worker has retained all essential rights in the new system, his security is somewhat less than it was before; the permanence of his employment depends now on the person who is making the business decisions. Unsuccessful directors will probably be sticking by the provisions which allow the administration of the enterprise to evaluate performance of work duties by workers and will take advantage of the opportunity to tighten discipline; but this has been pretty much limited by the legislation. On the other hand, the workers might now perhaps gain opportunities in practice to replace without an upheaval unsuccessful directors who by definition no longer have the committee behind them.

The real change has been in the environment for exercise of the workers' rights. Now that the enterprise is larger,

the workers' council is further away from the individual worker, and since it is oriented toward making decisions on strategic matters in conduct of the enterprise's business, this will no longer be the channel of the struggle for trade union rights. Many issues concerning status, the trade unions, and wages and salaries will no longer be left to the spontaneity of self-management, it seems, but now must be resolved in a clinch between the rights of the enterprise, the government, and the trade union. Nevertheless, the basic conflict of Yugoslav society is the conflict between the stratum of managers and the stratum of workers. In that context, the belief is spreading that the "nomenclature," in spite of the state of dissolution it is in, stands readiest for that period of unclear "anarchy."

Operation of Belgrade Stock Market Reviewed

90BA0017A Belgrade *EKONOMSKA POLITIKA*
in Serbo-Croatian 5 Mar 90 pp 19-20

[Article by V. Grlickov: "Holiday in Belgrade"]

[Text] Although not in "striking" amounts, the first trading (250 million dinars) on the Yugoslav Capital Market in Belgrade was an event that attracted a great deal of public interest. This was because it was the first postwar "capital" transaction that was conducted by institutional sales of securities (bonds) on the Capital Market (stock exchange). Similar transactions are also expected soon at the Ljubljana stock exchange, which was founded at the end of last year (somewhat earlier than the Belgrade one), and later on at the Zagreb stock exchange, which is expected to be founded at the end of March.

The Belgrade Capital Market, which is considered the "successor" of the first stock exchange in 1894 in the Kingdom of Serbia, conducted its first transaction by selling bonds "owned" by the fund for the underdeveloped areas of the Serbian Socialist Republic [SR]. There was a possibility of using federal bonds (from the federal fund for the underdeveloped areas), but according to Branislav Cosic, the Market's director, the missing documentation arrived too late. It is interesting that fewer bonds were sold than planned, primarily because the seller (the Belgrade Bank DD [joint stock company]) was not willing to give a larger discount to the buyers (Jugobanka DD). In other words, it did not want to sell the bonds for more than 30 percent below their nominal value.

The Belgrade Bank DD intends to use the funds obtained from selling the bonds to ensure its liquidity, while assuming that the money would be used to settle its obligations for investments in energy. In this case, the creditworthiness of these investments is not in dispute, at least when the matter is considered from the standpoint of the Capital Market, since for it (the Capital Market), what is essential is the creditworthiness of the bank selling the bonds itself, and authorization to operate on the Capital Market can only be obtained by a

bank whose creditworthiness has been verified. Furthermore, in principle the creditworthiness of the securities themselves is also verified by a competent federal commission that deals with these matters. Actually, it should be noted that according to regulations, the federal commission does not verify the creditworthiness of securities that are "owned" by sociopolitical communities, and that is precisely what would have been the case with these securities involved in the first transaction on the Capital Market.

For the time being, only banks have access to the Capital Market in Belgrade, and the only securities that can obtain a place on the quotation list are those backed by some bank. This fact should not be viewed negatively, because enterprises are still not objectively capable (in terms of knowledge and experience) of the new way of doing business through the stock market.

All of this does not mean that all the doors are closed to enterprises: they can operate here through the banks, or else a quotation for their securities can be listed if they "pass" the creditworthiness filter of the federal commission and the Market itself. Thus, for example, it is possible that there may soon be securities from Meblo, Lesnina, etc.

In all of this, there should not be any ownership "barriers." Both private enterprises and foreign persons who enter into arrangements with banks for operating on the stock exchange will be able to establish a presence. This, of course, does not mean that all of the ownership obstacles to operating on the Market have been eliminated: for example, an enterprise still cannot authorize a private broker to represent it, as in the developed market economies, but only a bank. Admittedly, there are no ownership restrictions with respect to banks: private banks can also represent enterprises, naturally, if they obtain the necessary authorization and pass the creditworthiness filters.

Of course, in assessing the possibilities for the successful operation of the Capital Market (and the stock exchanges), one should not overlook the factor of the limitations on the "goods" that would be traded here. There are limited sources of capital, which is only available from the population and the banks, and in very limited amounts at that. Talks are only beginning on "creating" high-quality sources through various investment funds, as in the market economies. These include pension funds, property and personal insurance funds, investment trust funds, etc. Admittedly, some of these funds are also present in our country, but they have a completely different role, and serve the state at various levels. They do not have a business or commercial function, as in the market economies, among other things because they are not based on the private deposits of those who save in order to ensure a secure old age (pensions), insure property and lives, etc. In market economies, such strong investment funds represent a basis for investments in the owners' securities (shares). Through these funds, enterprise shares are purchased at

a favorable (lower) price, and sold to private individuals (or the state). In this way, the desired conversion of ownership is conducted in order to ensure new business opportunities and programs for the enterprises. In our situation, there is nothing left but to have that business of ownership conversion handled by the banks.

Money Market

In contrast to the Capital Market, the Money Market, which handles short-term transactions as an intermediary between the supply of banks' liquid funds and the demand for them, has a longer tradition. Since it began to operate on 14 November 1989, the trading, sale, and purchase of liquid funds amounting to over 2 billion dinars have been conducted either through the Market for Money and Short-Term Securities (treasury notes, drafts, and certificates), or through relations among banks. Radisa Ndrljanski, the director of the Money Market, emphasized at a press conference that the volume of trading here was still unsatisfactory. The main reason for this is the low volume of funds in the banks' accounts (that is why the supply on the Market was 2.5 billion dinars, while the demand was 27 billion dinars), as a result of the banks' extremely low liquidity, especially after the adoption of restrictive monetary and credit measures. Liquidity has been reduced to less than 1 billion dinars per day, although in recent days the situation has improved somewhat: the banks have about 2 billion dinars in their current accounts, but whether that is a lasting phenomenon remains a matter of conjecture. It is possibly due to better collection of interest payments, reduced investments, etc., but is also due to larger sales of foreign exchange by banks which are thus trying to obtain dinar funds. People at the Money Market are particularly insistent upon the latter, since this confirms the rule of the link between the dinar and foreign exchange markets: under the conditions of their illiquidity and a high demand for liquid funds, there is usually an increase in the supply of foreign exchange being sold by the National Bank on the foreign exchange market. About \$980 million has been sold in this way since the beginning of the year.

Of course, low liquidity is not the only reason why trading on the Money Market has been lower than possible, because trading was also insufficient during the days of high liquidity before and after the New Year. In this case funds were not offered because the offerers were not satisfied with the amount of the interest rates. Since the Market began to operate, interest rates have ranged from 15.65 percent, to over 36 percent these days. Furthermore, we have observed the phenomenon that interest rates adjust (grow) considerably more quickly in situations when demand is higher than the supply of funds, than when the supply of money is higher than the demand (interest rates fall at a much slower rate). In this second situation, the banks would rather decide to let their money lie unused in the accounts than provide it, in their opinion, at a low interest rate. Naturally, holding onto the money can also be interpreted as the banks' intention of forcing higher interest rates, but also as a

sign of fear that without it they may become illiquid, for instance, because they do not have a secure possibility of repaying credits.

With all of this, interesting proposals are coming from the Market itself. In order to increase trading they are proposing, first, that in cases in which banks have a surplus of money in their current accounts, the National Bank allow them to deposit those funds for short terms at a higher interest rate than the one for required reserves. In cases of deteriorated liquidity, the banks could use this money, for short terms and especially funds from secondary sources, in the form of credits for liquidity, but at a somewhat higher interest rate than the interest on deposited funds. In the second place, they are proposing that the National Bank allow banks, instead of the current practice, according to which they are obligated to

keep the same amount of calculated and allocated required reserves every day, to meet that obligation by allocating more than the required average on some days and less on other days. In the third place, the Money and Securities Market in Belgrade is not concealing the fact that it ought to do more for the banks, its founders, for the sake of higher subscriptions to treasury notes, and become involved in trading other types of securities as well.

It is difficult to say whether these proposals, which also include more rigorous selection by the Market in "satisfying" demand, will be adopted. In any case, if they are, that would mean a change in the Market's status, because the possibility of depositing funds with it would mean that it would have the right to control money deposited by banks in its own name.

POLAND

AIDS Council: Interdepartmental Specialists, More Public Education

90WE0170W Warsaw SLUZBA ZDROWIA in Polish
No 10, 11 Mar 90 p 6

[Article by Ilona Dziewiecka: "AIDS—Telling It Like It Is"]

[Text] The first stage of the struggle with AIDS in Poland will come to an end this year. We ended the decade of the 1980's as one of the 120 countries in the world that admits to the presence of the HIV virus. After examining 3.5 million people, 721 carriers were detected, 32 who were ill, and 18 people died. It is possible that we will remain in the No. 3 epidemiological group (low risk level).

In March 1990 the present AIDS Council will be replaced by a new structure, a team of interdepartmental specialists. AIDS is a sickness from which the health service cannot isolate itself. The sickness gives rise to problems in the most diverse areas of life. They must be solved through the cooperation of several departments (including justice, national education, internal affairs). This means that the Chambers of Physicians must participate. The battle with the HIV virus should be everyone's concern. Prof. Tadeusz Chrusciel, president of the Chief Medical Council, asked the premier and the prime minister for help in creating a National AIDS Prevention Plan.

Throughout the world studies are being conducted on 11 antivirus preparations, but none of them has extended the life of a sick person by more than six to 12 months. The most effective method for battling the 20th-century sickness is infection prevention and its spread. In 1990 there will be no shortage of money for essential expenditures connected with the prevention of AIDS in Poland, said Andrzej Kosiniak-Kamysz, minister of health. Of the 15 trillion zlotys allocated to the ministry (this does not include wage reserves), 30 billion will be designated for the purchase and conduct of additional tests to detect the presence of the virus, and 10 billion zlotys will be designated for lump-sum payments to health service employees who come in contact with HIV patients and carriers. The amount of the payment, determined individually by managers, may be 84 percent of the lowest salary (now 120,000 zlotys). In addition to the money from the Ministry of Health budget, 70 billion zlotys will remain for additional, unanticipated expenditures connected with AIDS.

In the opinion of the ministry, already last year it was possible to meet 100 percent of the requirements for disposable equipment and protective clothing (80 percent came from the budget, the rest from foreign donations). Unfortunately, sometimes the voivodship doctors decided to allocate these funds for other purposes.

Lack of awareness of the danger and of methods for preventing infection, plus low interest on the part of the community in lectures and publications on AIDS, are unfortunately a fact. Dentists do not have personal-protection means. Fortunately, soon a large transport of donations from the EEC will arrive in Poland: aprons, face masks and shields used by dentists throughout the world.

This year the number of facilities available for treating the sick and the carriers should increase. More and more infectious-diseases departments are declaring their willingness and ability to accept them. Prof. Lidia Babiuch is finalizing the opening in Warsaw of the Chronic Immunological Deficiencies Clinic (20 hospital beds). Right now what is needed most is the formation of a network of diagnostic clinics, because most of the infected persons do not require hospitalization but regular examinations. It is the task of the ministry (deputy minister Krystyna Sienkiewicz is taking care of this personally) to also set up several hostels in which the carriers and the sick could stay (during the period of the examination), those who cannot find places for themselves in family homes. But the Cuban model—the creation of closed ghettos—will not be applied in Poland.

Nor is it envisaged that a law or an order will be enacted to require compulsory examination of patients admitted to hospitals to detect the HIV virus. Such practices in effect in some hospitals are a violation of human rights and the result of lack of knowledge about the risk. Only the following categories of persons are subject to compulsory examination: Blood donors, hemophiliacs, sex partners, infected persons, and foreigners coming to study in Poland. Testing of the following persons is encouraged: Venereal-disease clinic patients, homosexuals, and drug addicts during the course of their treatment to overcome the addiction.

The struggle with the irrational reactions of the public to the dangers of AIDS is no less a problem than the creation of the material conditions to fight it. The universal lack of knowledge on this illness is a fact. Because the tests are not 100-percent certain, awareness of the risk and danger is even more important. The latest studies have shown that the so-called serologic window (the time from the infection to appearance of the first antibodies detected in the test) can last not, as previously believed, from 2 to 6 weeks, but from 4 to 6 months or even longer. This increases the risk of infection during blood transfusions. This risk can be minimized by using equipment, soon to be imported, which will make it possible to safely draw and process blood. Minimization can also be achieved by making the public aware that persons in the so-called risk group should not donate blood.

The HIV virus came to Poland late as compared with the Western Europe countries. This makes it possible to utilize the experience of the West in the battle with AIDS. Great Britain has already offered to assist Poland in this matter. Already this year, two-week trips will be

arranged for 10 teams made up of one doctor and two nurses each. These teams will be trained in British hospitals.

Everyone knows that the threat of AIDS and the growing number of infected persons has created new tasks, particularly for the health service. Above all, although AIDS is frightening, the Hippocratic oath and the standards of professional ethics must not be forgotten. The Chambers of Physicians will oppose all cases of refusal of assistance to the sick and infected and the frequent lack of observance of professional confidentiality.

Fewer and fewer doctors and nurses are becoming panicky and refusing assistance, and more and more seldom are we treating virus carriers like "lepers." But there are still too many signs of intolerance. Intolerance can only be fought with knowledge. We should be reminded at this point that objects used by the infected which do not have traces of blood on them can be treated just like any other soiled objects. And blood ceases to be an infection carrier after 70 hours.

The Ministry of Health will not cease to disseminate knowledge about AIDS, the least infectious of the infectious diseases, and about the HIV virus, which is not very dangerous in contact and tragically dangerous after infection. Millions of pamphlets are being published on this subject, press conferences are being arranged (the above information was taken from the last one which was held on 26 February), and a series of weekly reports on AIDS for the TV "News" are being prepared.

Current Numbers of HIV-Infected, AIDS Patients Listed

*90WE0170Y Warsaw SLUZBA ZDROWIA in Polish
No 11, 18 Mar 90 p 5*

[Prepared by Dr. Wanda Szata, Epidemiological Commission of the Council on AIDS, and Epidemiological Institute of the State Institute of Hygiene]

[Text] During the period 1-14 February 1990, HIV infections were discovered in 21 Polish citizens, of whom 20 are intravenous-drug users, and during the period 15-18 February 1990, in 51 Polish citizens, including 41 intravenous-drug users.

In February 1990, one AIDS case was reported—a 27-year-old drug addict.

From the time studies were begun in 1985 to 28 February 1990, HIV infections were discovered in 772 Polish citizens, of whom 521 were intravenous-drug users.

A total of 33 people were ill with AIDS, of whom 19 died (temporary figures as of 28 February 1990).

As of 31 January 1990, a total of 215,144 cases of AIDS in the world were reported, of which 40,519 were in Africa, 142,065 in both Americas, 511 in Asia, 29,727 in Europe, 1,782 in the South Sea Islands. In Europe, most

of the cases were recorded in France (8,025), Italy (5,307), the FRG (4,306), and Spain (3,965). (Weekly Epidemiological Record, 1990-02-02, No. 5).

Health-Care Practitioners Discuss Their Fear of AIDS Patients

*90WE0170X Warsaw SLUZBA ZDROWIA in Polish
No 11, 18 Mar 90 p 5*

[Article by I.D. under rubric "Stop AIDS": "To Battle...Without Weapons?"]

[Text] The Sejm's Health Commission meeting held on 28 February was devoted to the epidemiological situation in the country. The optimistic report by Minister Andrzej Kosiniak-Kamysz, speaking about the low danger of AIDS in Poland and on the great chances for a successful battle with the HIV virus, aroused many doubts.

Attention was called to the fact that filling the "Cezal" warehouses to the walls with disposable equipment and protective devices does not give the right to be satisfied and to say that all requirements for these items have been filled. It makes no difference to the medical personnel who are in direct contact with the sick or infected whether the lack of protective means in the health service centers was caused by import shortcomings or lack of money to purchase them.

One of the deputies cited an interesting statistic concerning the exposure of the medical community to infection. Most of the infections occur as a result of a cut by an instrument or a needle prick—*injury to the skin*. The group most at risk are nurses, followed by laboratory employees and doctors. Cases of on-the-job infection with the HIV virus are rare. Nevertheless, half of them could be avoided if disposable gloves (including long gloves for obstetricians), eyeglasses, face masks, disposable aprons and disinfectant agents, were available, and if people knew more about the infection and how to proceed with AIDS patients.

Mentioned over and over again by the deputies was the lack of any kind of pamphlets or publications dealing with diagnosis and rules of behavior in cases of contact with the sick or infected, and the lack of basic disinfectants (lysol), and chemical indicators of the sterilization process, the so-called strips, large quantities of which were promised as far back as 1988. The medical community, especially workers in health centers far removed from the capital, look upon the actions of the ministry dealing with infection prevention and treatment of the sick and infected as improvised and incoherent. There is no consistent system or an effectively implemented program. To this day, the basic treatment personnel do not really know what to do with an infected patient, how to treat him, where to send him, and to which department to admit him.

And although no one questions the correctness of the position of the Chief Medical Council (published in the

No. 8 issue dated 25 February), the question arose: Who will be responsible for sending thousands of health-service employees to battle with the HIV virus without weapons? The material shortages are not a trivial argument for all of those who are afraid of infection and refuse to work around the sick and the carriers.

The subject of AIDS dominated the discussion. Other data concerning other infections, published in the report of the Main Health Inspectorate, was largely ignored. Yet an increased number of cases of measles, bacterial dysentery and food poisoning was recorded. The number of cases of hepatitis B, one of the highest in Europe, did not drop. However, there is hope that the continuation of the inoculations begun in 1988 of those health-service employees most exposed to HBV infection, and children of mothers who are HBS-antigen carriers, will bring about a reduction in the sick rate.

In terms of the health of its people, Poland ranks 28th among 32 European countries.

Journalist on Need for AIDS Public Education, Treatment Facilities

90WE0170Z Warsaw *TYGODNIK DEMOKRATYCZNY* in Polish No 12, 25 Mar 90
pp 4-5

[Interview with Wiktor Osiatynski, journalist, by Liliana Olchowik; place and date not given: "The Right To Be Afraid"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Osiatynski] I will be so bold as to say that in Poland there is no program for the treatment of drug addicts.

[TYGODNIK DEMOKRATYCZNY] And the movement formed by Marek Kotanski is simply a spectacular partisan war?

[Osiatynski] This is an excellent and useful thing, but it is not a treatment program. Kotanski allows addicts to leave the outside world and live in a kind of ghetto, without drugs. It provides a certain comfort to people who are emotionally ill and cannot cope with normal life, and it is from among these kinds of people that drug addicts come. Yet throughout the world, addiction treatment programs are designed so that after detoxification and, for example, a 28-day stay in a treatment center, a person has learned how to conduct himself. He leaves the center and begins to deal with normal problems. Because these are not people doomed to another kind of life, but only people who need help in rebuilding a system of reacting and thinking, which is almost impossible without professional therapy. Unfortunately, there is no way to do this in Poland. To say nothing of the fact that in the case of juvenile drug addicts, 100 percent of the cases of addiction are connected with a dysfunctional family. And after all, MONAR [Young Peoples Movement To Combat Drug Addiction] is not able to provide family therapy.

[TYGODNIK DEMOKRATYCZNY] Since AIDS brings with it so many problems, in what order, in your opinion, should the funds be divided?

[Osiatynski] It would be ridiculous in our conditions to spend money on scientific research. In the Ministry of Health there is an AIDS council comprised of scientists. They will certainly want to designate part of the funds for scientific research on AIDS. We are too poor for that. The United States and the European Community have not yet been able to achieve any practical success in this field. If they are successful it will be in their best interest to share this knowledge with us. At the most, we could allocate a minimum amount of money to send a couple of Polish scientists to participate in Western studies. Let us not cheat society.

[TYGODNIK DEMOKRATYCZNY] What, then, should we spend money on?

[Osiatynski] On prevention and education. To have available in every hospital disposable gloves, syringes and means of protection. For treatment, naturally, but also to free narcotics addicts from their addiction. Because it is not a matter of indifference as to whether a person dies with dignity or in squalor. To say nothing of the fact that every person sick with AIDS who is no longer a drug addict will be a very convincing example for those who are still addicts but are not yet infected.

[TYGODNIK DEMOKRATYCZNY] And also to say nothing of the fact that a sick person or an HIV-carrier who remains addicted is most often an irresponsible individual, and therefore, especially threatening to the surroundings...

[Osiatynski] During the Open Studio program devoted to AIDS I answered a telephone call asking what is the responsibility of HIV-infected people for their way of life after they learned of their illness. During the program there was no time at all to take up this issue. Everyone tried to be high-minded and understanding as regards one of the fears of the sick people—ostracism by the healthy. And yet the question was important. Personally, I am in favor of moral condemnation for irresponsible behavior, even if it concerns a dying person. I also understand the other fear—the fear of the healthy. I remember that while I was in the United States at an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting (attended also by drug addicts), standing next to me was a very frail individual, covered with spots. I had a cut on my hand at the time. I discreetly moved a few feet away so as not to have to shake hands with him, which is traditional at the end of such meetings. Later I was ashamed of this, but that is how it was.

[TYGODNIK DEMOKRATYCZNY] In other words, we should not be outraged at the "Kaweczyn [Warsaw suburb] philistinism," because first, this is an understandable phenomenon, and second, it is a passing one.

[Osiatynski] I am not so conceited as to say that others are philistines. Fear is the most natural human emotion.

I do not believe anyone who says he is unafraid. Maximilian Kolbe was also afraid, but nevertheless he went to his death. Let us give people the right to be afraid and to express this fear. Naturally, we cannot kill out of fear, or do harm, or throw stones at others. Feelings are the most honest part of us: they come and go without control. The problem arises when we distort them. However, human nature is based first on valuing our own feelings and second on not reacting to some of them. And here we have to educate—help to conquer this fear. Returning to the Kaweczyn matter, I think that if we were to talk to these people today, without labeling them but respecting their fear, it would turn out that there are among them many who can already tomorrow be tolerant. More so than in the communities which did not show this fear and anger. After all, when the deputy minister of health went there after these events, they said: "We will take care of our own who are sick."

[TYGODNIK DEMOKRATYCZNY] I think that this is a good closing for our conversation. Thank you.

Future Drug Market Feared as Economy Improves
90WD0286Z Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
12 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by Ewa Kozierkiewicz-Widermanska: "The Slender Thread of White Powder"]

[Text] In the autumn of 1989, customs officials at Okecie Airport outside Warsaw discovered an air freight shipment containing 12 kilograms of marihuana. In January of this year, following a tip from the Dutch Police, 8 kilograms of marihuana were intercepted which, like the previous shipment, had originated in Africa and was on its way to West Berlin.

So we finally have Europe! Unable to boast of too many achievements, we have at least managed to have our own narcotics traffic. Of course, this is not the way things are, and, as we are told by Col. Stanislaw Szkodzinski, head of the Department to Combat Narcotics of the KG [Main Headquarters] MO's [Citizens Militia] Criminal Office, our country does not basically lie along any international narcotics routes. There are just two world narcotics smuggling routes. One originates in what is called the Golden Triangle (Thailand, Burma, Laos) and the other in the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran)—these are the major producers of opium and opium derivatives—continuing on to Western Europe and then the United States. On the other hand, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico, among others, are the producers and suppliers of cocaine, which is absolutely flooding both Americas but rarely reaches Europe.

But there is also a channel called the Balkan connection, ending in Prague, which has air connections to just about the entire world. From there some of the heroin goes directly to Bern and other Swiss cities, then a slender thread of it leads to the Scandinavian countries, from which it runs through Warsaw, Szczecin, and Swinoujscie.

So we are home, except that it is difficult to call this slender smuggling thread running through Poland a real narcotics route, because it is a road from the place of production to the receiver, or consumer. For smuggling and drug traffic to exist, there must also be a market, because in narcotics the law of pure economics prevails. Nobody here pays into the business, and nobody backs anyone, but the operations of the perfectly organized drug world are just about flawless. The dollar price has remained unchanged over the past decade or more. It is a question not of destroying the customer but of getting the most money out of him. All the world drug gangs see to this.

In this context then Poland is not an attractive partner for the producer or middleman, but Col. Szkodzinski thinks that we have the dubious opportunity to become a real market for selling opium or cocaine specialties in a few years. Today our drug addicts satisfy themselves with domestically produced mixtures and are unable to afford a gram of heroin for \$120, but tomorrow, as society becomes richer, or so we hope, we will face all sorts of European "attractions," in the form of real smuggling and drug traffic with all their consequences.

This is particularly true in that only to the end of this year will people in Poland be allowed to cultivate poppies privately on farmhouse garden plots. Then which way will our drug production go? Illegal cultivation will be nearly impossible, because of the lack of accessible undetected land. Therefore there is the more disturbing vision of illegal production of amphetamines, which is still turning up in small quantities today and is destined mainly for the western market.

The drug route is not, as some joke, a beaten path with a series of relay horses carrying a smuggler bearing a sack of heroin on his back. These are superbly organized routes with professional couriers travelling by means of transportation befitting the end of the 20th century. The first such courier was detected in our country about 10 years ago. Later, for a few years a certain part of the heroin passed through Poland on its way from the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia and Austria on the Chopin train. Today the biggest problem for the police is motor transport, particularly the freight hauled by established shippers. For example, detailed TIR monitoring can last even a week, because drugs are usually carried in small quantities, and effective concealment is very easy.

"We work in close cooperation with just about all the countries along our borders and nearby," Col. Szkodzinski says. "There was recently the partial implementation, as we call it, of three attempts to smuggle nearly 30 kilograms of amphetamines out of Poland into the FRG. Up to the present time we have arrested nearly ten people, mostly Poles, and it's possible the three cases are related, but all this affects only the couriers or even coincidental tourists, who are often unaware of what they are carrying and for whom. On the other hand, we can anticipate that this whole affair lies in our future. Let's hope that our police forces can prepare for it."

'Community,' Nonstate Schools Growing in Popularity, Seeking Sponsors

90EP0512A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish
15 Mar 90 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Community Schools Are Becoming Stronger, Not Prospering"]

[Text] Twenty-eight new community educational associations are running 21 elementary schools and 13 secondary schools in Poland. At least as many more will open in September.

Representatives of MEN [Ministry of National Education] talked about the development of nonstate education at a press conference on Wednesday.

All the community schools have the same authorization as the government schools. Their report cards, diplomas, and student commuter discount passes are valid just the same. The school inspectors and MEN oversee them the same way.

The students rate them far higher than the state schools. They are glad to attend and make far more rapid progress in their school work. The representatives of MEN and the educational societies think the reason is that they are created "by genuine parent groups and committed teachers and students."

The fees range from 50,000 to 200,000 zlotys per month, but they do not cover the educational costs. The schools are seeking more sponsors. They usually pay the teachers less than the state educational system does.

On 26 February, Minister Samsonowicz issued a decision to grant them a permanent subsidy amounting to 50 percent of the average monthly cost to educate one pupil in the state schools (estimated at about 70,000 zlotys). This will add up to about 600 million zlotys by the end of the school year.

3-Year Language Colleges

90EP0512B Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish
16 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by (dr): "Imported Schools"]

[Text] There has been sustained interest in three-year language colleges, a new type of postsecondary school. Parents are bombarding the Ministry of National Education with telephone calls to ask when recruitment will begin and what sort of questions will be on the entrance examinations.

The problem is just that there is a shortage of about 20,000 English teachers. They also need people to teach

German and Romance languages. The ministry is planning to create 30 colleges for this purpose. There will be between two and four groups of 15 persons studying in them at one time.

The Ministry of National Education has already received over a dozen announcements from citizen committees and voivodship presidents offering space for the colleges and lists of teachers eager for jobs.

Former party buildings are usually offered:

The Citizens Committee in Przemysl proposed the former Voivodship Committee building (which had previously been the cloister of the Hospitallers of St. John of God).

The Wroclaw Voivodship president has offered former party school buildings, formal lecture halls, two comfortable apartments, a library, and nearby recreational areas with a swimming pool and tennis courts.

There are plans to open colleges in Gdynia, Krakow, Zamosc, Czestochowa, and Sieradz, among others.

Minister Henryk Samsonowicz will make the location decision after 15 March. Meanwhile, the acceptance of students can begin. Entrance examinations (in Polish and the language major) will be held following the secondary school graduation examinations, but no later than the college entrance examinations.

The teachers will be citizens from Western countries, among others, and all lessons are to be conducted in the foreign language. The U.S. Peace Corps has promised four teachers for each newly opened college.

New schools will also be opened at the following institutions: Warsaw University wants to set up a college with the help of the Batory fund, Lodz University will have a French-language school, and Marie Curie-Sklodowska University in Lublin will have English, French, and German.

The three years of study will terminate in an examination which the organizers envision will meet the requirements of western college examinations. After making up for any curriculum differences, the graduates will be eligible for university study.

The Ministry of National Education is afraid that some of the graduates will take jobs in easier, better paid professions. Foreign scholarships limited to people who work several years as teachers may encourage them to work in schools.

Statistical Listing of Catholic Clergy Reported

90EP0485A Czestochowa NIEDZIELA in Polish No 11,
18 Mar 90 p 3

[Article: "Statistics on the Church in Poland"]

[Text] The press office of the Episcopate of Poland published statistics on the regular and secular clergy in

Poland, in its PISMO OKOLNE (Circular) No. 1, of this year. The figures given show that as of 20 October 1989, there were 24,678 priests, including 18,601 diocesan priests and 6,077 regular priests. This was 602 higher than the 1968 total, and it was more than 4,000 higher than the 1981 figure.

The Diocese of Krakow had the largest number of priests, 1,241, followed by the Dioceses of Tarnow and Wroclaw, with 1,238, and Warsaw, with 1,127. The dioceses with the largest number of newly ordained priests were Katowice, with 71; Lublin, 64; Krakow, 63; Przemysl, 58; Warsaw, 48; and Chelmno, 44.

Among the ordinations of religious in Poland, the largest number of regular priests came from the Franciscan order, 36; the Salesians, 25; the Society of Christ [Chrys-tusowcy], 23; the Divine Word Missionaries and Conventional Franciscans, 18 each; and the Pallotines, 17.

A total of 1,152 priests were ordained last year, 826 secular priests for dioceses and 326 regular priests, belonging to religious congregations.

A total of 5,499 seminarians entered diocesan seminaries, and 3,320 entered the seminaries of religious orders and congregations. Compared to 1988, there was a decline in the overall number of seminarians in Poland and a decline in diocesan seminaries, but an increase was noted in the number of seminarians who are religious. These changes have also been noted in the entrance year of seminary study. Last year, 978 candidates applied to the diocesan seminaries, 150 fewer than in 1988, but the religious orders had 614 candidates for their seminaries, 11 more than in 1988.

There were 723 novices in men's communities in Poland. The Jesuits had the largest number of novices, with 69, followed by the Salesians, with 66, and the Franciscans, with 50.

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